


Friedrich
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MITVIM
The Israel Institute for
Regional Foreign Policies

The Israeli Foreign Policy Index 2026



Findings of the Mitvim Institute Survey

June 2026



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The 14th annual public opinion survey of the Mitvim Institute on Israel's foreign policy was completed in early June 2026. The survey was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute, in collaboration with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Foundation, among a representative sample of Israel's adult population (844 men and women, Jews and Arabs, sampled according to Israel's current political breakdown), with a sampling error of 3.4%.

The 2026 Foreign Policy Index, published several months before the elections to the 26th Knesset, comes as Israel remains embroiled in ongoing conflicts of varying intensity with Iran, in Lebanon, and in Gaza. It is also being released amid an unprecedented diplomatic crisis and a sharp deterioration in Israel's international image.

In addition to examining public attitudes toward the war in Gaza and Israeli policy in the West Bank, the survey seeks to assess public views regarding Israel's desired strategy in the other two main arenas of fighting over the past year - Iran and Lebanon. It focuses on public attitudes toward the possibility of moving from a military campaign to a future arrangement in each of the three arenas. The survey also examines public attitudes toward the state of Israel's relations with the Arab world and Turkey following these campaigns. At the same time, the Index examines the public response to the possibility of shaping a new relationship with longstanding enemies to the north - Syria and Lebanon. A distinct focus of the survey is the ongoing deterioration of Israel's international standing and public perceptions of Western measures toward Israel in response to the war in Gaza.

This document presents the survey's findings in four chapters: Israel's foreign relations; Israel and the Palestinians; Israel's relations with regional actors; and Israeli policy toward Iran, Lebanon, and Syria.

* Data marked with * refer to respondents with an opinion, excluding those who did not express an opinion.

** This refers to voters for Beyachad, Yashar, and Yisrael Beiteinu.

The voter analysis refers to the Jewish sector only.

1. Israel's Foreign Relations

- The Israeli public's assessment of **Israel's global standing** shows some improvement (5.18 compared with 4.39 last year). Nearly half of the public considers Israel's global standing to be good or fairly good, compared with one-third of respondents last year. There is a direct correlation between voting intentions in the upcoming elections and assessments of Israel's global standing. More than 75% of voters for coalition parties are satisfied with Israel's global standing, compared with 26% of voters for Bennett's Beyachad party and 3% of voters for the Democrats party.
- The public's assessment of the **government's foreign-policy performance** remains low, despite a modest improvement (4.72 compared with 3.93 last year). As expected, there is a clear correlation between voting intentions and levels of satisfaction.
- A large majority of the Israeli public (66%)* is concerned or very concerned about **Israel's deterioration into a "pariah state."** This marks an increase compared with last year (57%). More than 66% of Otzma Yehudit and ultra-Orthodox party voters are only slightly concerned or not concerned at all.
- Continuing the trend of the past two years, a majority of the Israeli public (58%) attaches great importance to **Israel's place in the liberal-democratic camp of the Western world.** Only about 11% of respondents believe this affiliation has no importance at all. 18% of respondents have not yet formed an opinion on the issue. Supporters of the ultra-Orthodox parties and Otzma Yehudit stand out in this regard: more than 60% of them attach little or no importance to Israel's place in the Western world.
- When asked to name the **three most important countries to Israel besides the United States, Germany** continues to lead as the most important country by a significant margin (45%). At the same time, this year saw a notable rise in the importance attributed to **China** and the **United Arab Emirates** at the expense of European states. The

United Kingdom and China share second place (26%). The United Arab Emirates jumped from 5% to 19%. The declining trend in Russia's importance continued (from 26% last year to 22% this year). Slight increases were also recorded in the importance attributed to India, Saudi Arabia, and Argentina.

- › After imposing partial ceasefires on Israel in Gaza, Iran, and Lebanon, a decisive majority of the Israeli public is critical of **Trump's policy and its implications for Israel's interests**. 31% believe his steps harm the interests of the State of Israel, and 27% believe they serve Israeli interests in the short term but harm them in the long term. Only 13% believe Trump's steps serve Israeli interests, and the same share believe his steps harm Israel in the short term but benefit it in the long term.

2. Israel and the Palestinians

- The public is divided over an international package deal that would include the **establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state, the disarmament and removal of Hamas from power in Gaza, and full normalization with the Arab world**. 41% support the package deal, compared with 40% who oppose it. Nearly one-fifth of respondents have not yet formed an opinion on the issue. Support for this package deal remains a clear dividing line, as it was last year. Two-thirds of voters for the opposition's right-wing and centrist parties** support or somewhat support the package, compared with fewer than one-quarter of coalition voters.
- A majority of the public (59%)* supports Israeli assistance or direct involvement in **the American plan for Gaza's reconstruction**. Among those who support involvement, most - 39% of all respondents with an opinion - favor Israeli assistance for international and regional reconstruction efforts, but without active Israeli involvement.
- The public is divided over **Trump's 20-point plan**, which includes the demilitarization and reconstruction of Gaza, the deployment of an international force, and a framework for progress toward a Palestinian state following reforms in the Palestinian Authority. 38% of respondents oppose the plan, compared with 33% who support it. A substantial share of the public - 29% of respondents - has not yet formed an opinion. Although the plan was approved by the government, a clear majority of coalition-party supporters oppose it. In contrast, a majority of opposition-party voters—including voters for right-wing and centrist parties—support it. For example, half of Beyachad voters support the plan, compared with one-quarter who oppose it and another quarter who have not yet formed an opinion.
- The largest share of the public (48%) believes that **military pressure is the most effective tool for defeating Hamas**. Of these, 32% believe Israel should return to fighting and fully occupy the Gaza Strip to achieve this goal. Another 16% view continuing the current combination of

military, diplomatic, and economic pressure on Hamas as the desired strategy. By contrast, 23% see promoting an alternative governing authority to Hamas under the Trump plan, together with support from an international force, as the decisive component. 12% support bringing in international intervention forces instead of the IDF to demilitarize the Gaza Strip. 17% have not yet formed an opinion. Among voters for all opposition parties, the governing alternative is the preferred option. Among coalition voters, by contrast, the military option is dominant by a wide margin.

- On the question of the **preferred solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict**, the public remains divided. Annexation and the application of sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank remain the leading option (30%), similar to last year's result. 25% of respondents support a two-state solution within the framework of a regional normalization deal. Only 14% support continuing to manage the conflict under the current situation in Gaza and the West Bank, and only 5% support establishing a single egalitarian democratic state from the river to the sea. The high share of respondents who have not yet formed an opinion is particularly notable: more than one-quarter of all respondents. This represents a significant increase in the share of respondents who have not yet formed an opinion compared with last year. Nearly half of Beyachad and Yashar voters view the two-state solution as the preferred way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, compared with only 20% who support annexation of the territories and slightly less than one-quarter who support continued management of the conflict.
- Continuing last year's trend, the largest share of the Israeli public (42%) sees a strong link between **legislation to change the judicial system and advancing the application of sovereignty over the territories in the West Bank**. By contrast, 27% believe the two trends are unrelated or only loosely connected. A large share of respondents (31%) has not yet formed an opinion.

- › The public is divided over the **international initiative to impose sanctions on violent settlers and settler organizations that encourage violence in the territories**. 41% oppose these sanctions, compared with 37% who support them. More than one-fifth of respondents have not yet formed an opinion.
- › As in last year's survey, the public remains divided on what **Israeli banks should do if the international community threatens to impose sanctions on the banks over their activity in the settlements, in a way that would harm Israeli citizens' savings and access to credit**. 38% believe the banks should ignore the sanctions and continue operating in the settlements. 24% believe the banks should stop operating there, while 13% believe they should halt their activity in the settlements, subject to state compensation for the settlers. One-quarter of respondents have not yet formed an opinion.
- › The public attaches great importance (7.16 out of 10) to establishing a **regional cooperation framework to address the climate crisis in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin**. About half of respondents saw this initiative as very important. This reflects an increase in support compared with the results recorded in 2024, although it has not yet returned to the level of importance attributed to the issue before October 7 (7.5).
- › Continuing the trend from last year, a majority of the Israeli public (57%) supports **Israeli cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank on urgent environmental issues** either to a great extent or to some extent. This compares with 43% who oppose such cooperation or support it only to a slight extent. Beyond the broad support for such cooperation among opposition-party voters, more than 40% of Likud and Religious Zionism voters also support it.

3. Israel and Regional Actors

- › The largest share of the Israeli public (32%) believes that the **current state of continued military confrontation in Gaza endangers the future of the normalization process with the Arab world**, compared with 23% who believe it actually strengthens Arab willingness for normalization. 26% believe the war has had no significant impact on Israel's relations with Arab states. 19% of respondents have not yet formed an opinion.
- › By contrast, and similar to the results recorded after the 12-day war with Iran (June 2025), the largest share of the Israeli public (37%) believes the **war with Iran actually increased Arab willingness for normalization with Israel**. Only 17% believe it reduced that willingness. 27% believe the war did not significantly affect the normalization process. Nearly one-fifth of respondents have not yet formed an opinion.
- › The public is divided over whether Israel should **make concessions toward the Palestinians in exchange for normalization with Saudi Arabia**. 41% believe normalization should be promoted as part of a renewed move toward a two-state solution, or support advancing practical steps, such as dismantling outposts in the West Bank, in exchange for diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. By contrast, about 39% oppose any concession on the Palestinian issue as part of advancing normalization with Saudi Arabia. One-fifth of respondents have not yet formed an opinion. 67% of Beyachad voters under Bennett's leadership and 62% of Yashar voters support compromises in exchange for normalization, compared with only 32% of Likud voters.
- › The public's ranking of the two **Middle Eastern countries most important to Israel's foreign relations** has shifted, with Gulf states gaining ground at the expense of Israel's long-standing peace partners, Egypt and Jordan. Egypt continues to lead the list by a significant margin (51%). The United Arab Emirates rose sharply to second place (33% compared with 12% last year), while Jordan dropped to third

place (30% compared with 44%). Saudi Arabia ranks fourth. Despite political changes in the region, only 11% of respondents selected Lebanon or Syria as one of the two most important Middle Eastern countries for Israel.

- **The Israeli public continues to view the restoration and strengthening of relations with Jordan as a highly important goal** (7.42 out of 10). More than 80% of respondents described it as important or fairly important.
- **The Israeli public's hostility toward the EU**, identified last year, has persisted. The share of Israelis who view Israel's leading trade partner as an adversary remains unchanged at 67%, compared with only 14% who see it as a friend.
- By contrast, **public attitudes toward Germany**, a central EU member state, show the opposite pattern: 64% view Germany as a friend, and only 18% view it as an adversary.

4. Israeli Strategy toward Iran, Syria, and Lebanon

- › The largest share of the Israeli public (37%) believes, in retrospect, that **it was a mistake to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement in 2018**, as Trump did under Netanyahu's pressure. 31% believe the decision was right. A substantial share of respondents - about 32% of the public - has not yet formed a position.
- › At the same time, **a majority of the Israeli public supports renewing the campaign against Iran**. 42% of respondents support renewing the campaign with the aim of bringing down the regime. Another 15% believe the campaign should be renewed in order to achieve a better agreement with the Iranian regime. Only 16% believe military action has run its course and that Israel should act to reach an agreement with Iran. These figures are similar to those obtained after last year's campaign against Iran, and only 10% support continued conflict management with Iran through recurring rounds of escalation (June 2025). Support for renewed military action is a dividing line: it is strong among supporters of the opposition's right-wing and centrist parties**, but much weaker among Democrats voters, only 28% of whom support it, while about 71% favor pursuing an agreement with Iran.
- › A large majority of the Israeli public (63%) believes that **the security zone recently established by Israel in southern Lebanon** contributes to, or significantly contributes to, the long-term security of residents of the north. An analysis of the results among supporters of the opposition's right-wing and centrist parties shows that they are split fairly evenly on this question.
- › A decisive majority of the Israeli public believes that **disarming Hezbollah** is a realistic goal in the near future. Most respondents see international diplomatic action as the central component for achieving this goal. 24% support regional and international pressure on the organization by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. 17% support strengthening the Lebanese government and

the Lebanese army with international assistance. By contrast, 30% believe the emphasis should be on continued Israeli military pressure until the organization is disarmed. 15% believe disarming Hezbollah is not a realistic goal in the near future. The preferred path to disarming Hezbollah is a clear dividing line: most voters for the opposition's right-wing and centrist parties favor diplomatic tools, while most coalition voters favor military pressure.

- The Israeli public remains divided over how Israel should deal with **the al-Sharaa regime in Damascus**. However, the share of those who believe Israel should act to topple it has declined (from 26% last year to 16% this year)*, while the share of those who support a temporary or long-term arrangement with the al-Sharaa regime has increased slightly (from 41% last year to 47% this year)*. Among supporters of an arrangement*, 30% support promoting a long-term political and economic agreement with the al-Sharaa government, and 17% support promoting a temporary security arrangement - withdrawal from Syrian territory in exchange for the demilitarization of the border area and guarantees for the safety of the Druze minority in Syria. By contrast, about 37% support continuing the current policy of military responses to threats and maintaining an Israeli presence inside Syrian territory. About one-quarter of respondents have not yet formed an opinion on the issue.
- On the question of Israel's preferred strategy toward Turkey, most of the public (54%) supports a diplomatic effort to improve ties with Turkey. Of these, 36% support renewing dialogue with Turkey in order to reach understandings in key arenas such as Syria and Iran, and 18% support renewing cooperation and restoring relations with Turkey. Only 28% of respondents see Turkey as a security threat and believe Israel should curb its regional influence, even at the cost of escalation and further deterioration in relations between the two countries. 18% of respondents have not yet formed an opinion on the issue. A diplomatic approach toward Turkey enjoys support among voters for all parties except Otzma Yehudit.

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Background Variables of the Sample

Sample size: 844.

Gender: 50% women and 50% men.

The Arab public constitutes 16.8% of the total sample.

Immigrants from the former Soviet Union constitute 15% of the Jewish sector.

The survey was completed in early June 2026.

1. Israel's Foreign Relations

Trends Over the Years

	2026	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016
Israel's Global Standing	5.18	4.39	4.31	5.03	5.85	5.58	5.63	6.10	5.82	5.49	5.01
The Government's performance in the field of foreign policy	4.72	3.93	3.84	4.82	5.53	5.29	6.05	5.99	5.22	5.05	4.55

* In the years 2016–2018, the question regarding the state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was phrased differently.

1. Overall, what is your impression of Israel's global standing today? Please rate on a scale of 1–10, where 10 means very good and 1 means very poor.

Response	2026	2025	2024
1 - very poor	14%	16%	17%
2	6%	9%	6%
3	10%	15%	16%
4	11%	11%	15%
5	12%	16%	15%
6	11%	9%	13%
7	12%	12%	10%
8	15%	8%	4%
9	5%	2%	1%
10 - very good	4%	2%	3%
Average score on a scale of 1–10	5.18	4.39	4.31

Israel's global standing – grouped by sector

Israel's global standing - grouped by sector	Total	Jews	Arabs
1-3 Poor	30%	28%	38%
4-5 Fair	23%	22%	26%
6-7 Good	23%	24%	20%
8-10 Excellent	24%	26%	16%
1-10 Average	5.18	5.33	4.44

Israel's global standing – multi-year trend

	2026	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016
Total sample	5.18	4.39	4.31	5.03	5.85	5.58	5.63	6.1	5.82	5.49	5.01

2. To what extent are you satisfied with the government's performance in the field of foreign policy? Please rate on a scale of 1–10, where 10 means very satisfied and 1 means not at all satisfied.

Response	סה"כ	Grouped
1 - Not at all satisfied	27%	40%
2	6%	
3	7%	
4	7%	16%
5	9%	
6	9%	21%
7	12%	
8	12%	23%
9	6%	
10 - Very satisfied	5%	
Average 1-10	4.72	

Government’s foreign-policy performance – grouped by sector

2026	Total	Jews	Arabs
1-3 Dissatisfied	40%	38%	50%
4-5 Not very satisfied	16%	16%	15%
6-7 Quite satisfied	21%	21%	20%
8-10 Satisfied	23%	25%	15%
Average score on a scale of 1-10	4.72	4.86	3.98

Government’s foreign-policy performance – multi-year trend

	2026	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016
Total sample	4.72	3.93	3.84	4.82	5.53	5.29	6.05	5.99	5.22	5.05	4.55
Jewish sector	4.86	4.05	3.96	4.89	5.52	5.25	6.16	6.22	5.37	5.34	4.58
Arab sector	3.98	3.30	3.24	4.39	5.58	5.57	5.40				

3. Global surveys over the past year show Israel’s continued deterioration into the status of a “pariah state.” How concerned are you about this trend?

Response	Total	Among those expressing an opinion	Jews (93%)	Arabs (77%)	Grouped, among those expressing an opinion
Very concerned	32%	35%	34%	42%	66%
Concerned	28%	31%	30%	36%	
Slightly concerned	17%	19%	20%	14%	34%
Not concerned at all	13%	15%	16%	8%	
No opinion	10%	-	-	-	

The question was asked in the two previous surveys, in 2024 and 2025, though with slightly different wording: in those surveys, the deterioration in Israel’s standing referred specifically to Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Multi-year comparison – total sample, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (90%)	2025 (85%)	2024 (90%)
Concerned	66%	57%	57%
Not concerned	34%	43%	43%

Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (93%)	2025 (93%)	2024 (92%)
Concerned	64%	56%	56%
Not concerned	36%	44%	44%

Multi-year comparison – Arab sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (77%)	2025 (74%)	2024 (81%)
Concerned	78%	67%	67%
Not concerned	22%	33%	33%

4. How important is it for Israel to be part of the liberal-democratic camp of the Western world?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (82%)	Jews (85%)	Arabs (72%)
Very important	26%	25%	31%	32%	30%	43%
Quite important	32%	34%	25%	39%	40%	34%
Not very important	13%	14%	9%	16%	16%	13%
Not at all important	11%	12%	7%	13%	14%	10%
No opinion	18%	15%	28%	-	-	-

Multi-year comparison – total sample, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (83%)	2025 (85%)	2024 (78%)
Very important + Quite important	71%	73%	77%
Not very important + Not at all important	29%	27%	23%










Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (85%)	2025 (88%)	2024 (80%)
Very important + Quite important	70%	73%	79%
Not very important + Not at all important	30%	27%	21%










Multi-year comparison – Arab sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (72%)	2025 (73%)	2024 (71%)
Very important + Quite important	77%	76%	65%
Not very important + Not at all important	23%	24%	35%

5. Besides the US, which three countries are currently most important to Israel? (Up to 3 answers, among those who mentioned any country other than the United States - 60% of all respondents.)

Country	Total (60%)	Jews (63%)	Arabs (46%)
 Germany	45.0%	46.4%	37.2%
 United Kingdom	26.3%	26.2%	26.7%
 China	26.1%	25.6%	29.1%
 Russia	21.6%	21.4%	23.3%
 United Arab Emirates	18.6%	18.8%	17.4%
 France	14.3%	13.9%	16.3%
 India	13.7%	15.3%	4.7%
 Egypt	11.7%	11.3%	14.0%
 Saudi Arabia	10.8%	9.9%	16.3%

Multi-year comparison – total sample, among those who named any country other than the United States

		2026 (60%)	2025 (62%)	2024 (66%)	2023 (85%)
 Germany	↓	45.0%	61.3%	57.9%	35.3%
 United Kingdom	↓	26.3%	47.2%	62.4%	31.5%
 China	↑	26.1%	15.9%	9.9%	28.5%
 Russia	↓	21.6%	25.9%	16.1%	33.8%
 United Arab Emirates	↑	18.6%	5.2%	5.7%	11.3%
 France	↓	14.3%	29.2%	43.5%	23.1%
 India	↑	13.7%	9.4%	5.6%	6.4%
 Egypt	↓	11.7%	12.4%	17.3%	23.6%
 Saudi Arabia	↑	10.8%	7.7%	10.3%	12.9%

6. In recent months, Trump forced Israel into partial ceasefires in Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza. Which of the following statements is closest to your position?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (84%)	Jews (88%)	Arabs (67%)
Trump's steps serve Israel's interests	13%	11%	24%	15%	12%	36%
Trump's steps serve Israel in the short term but harm it in the long term	27%	28%	21%	32%	32%	32%
Trump's steps harm Israel in the short term but serve it in the long term	13%	14%	11%	16%	16%	16%
Trump's steps harm Israel's interests	31%	35%	11%	37%	40%	16%
No opinion	16%	12%	33%	-	-	-

2. Israel and the Palestinians

7. What is your level of support for an arrangement that would include the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state, the disarmament and removal of Hamas from power in Gaza, and full normalization with the Arab world?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (81%)	Jews (84%)	Arabs (65%)
Strongly support	16%	13%	31%	20%	16%	48%
Somewhat support	25%	26%	20%	31%	30%	32%
Somewhat oppose	16%	17%	10%	19%	20%	15%
Strongly oppose	24%	28%	4%	30%	34%	5%
No opinion	19%	16%	35%			
Grouped: Support				51%	46%	80%
Grouped: Oppose				49%	54%	20%

In previous years, the question was phrased slightly differently, but the response options were unchanged.

Multi-year comparison – total sample, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (81%)	2025 (85%)	2024 (81%)
Support	51%	55%	55%
Oppose	49%	45%	45%

Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (84%)	2025 (88%)	2024 (83%)
Support	46%	52%	52%
Oppose	54%	48%	48%

Multi-year comparison – Arab sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (65%)	2025 (78%)	2024 (71%)
Support	80%	69%	70%
Oppose	20%	31%	30%

8. The United States has presented and is implementing a comprehensive plan for Gaza's reconstruction. What do you think Israel's role should be in this process?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (82%)	Jews (85%)	Arabs (72%)
Israel should not cooperate with the regional reconstruction process	33%	38%	11%	41%	45%	15%
Israel should allow and support international and regional efforts but refrain from taking an active role	32%	33%	27%	39%	39%	38%
Israel should take an active role, making reconstruction a central goal in rebuilding its relations with regional states and the Palestinians	17%	14%	34%	20%	16%	47%
No opinion	18%	15%	28%	-	-	-

In the previous survey, the question was phrased differently, but the response options were unchanged.

Multi-year comparison – total sample, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (82%)	2025 (87%)
Israel should not cooperate with the regional reconstruction process	41%	35%
Israel should allow and support international and regional efforts on the issue, but not take an active role	39%	45%
Israel should take an active role – making reconstruction a central goal in rebuilding its relations with regional states and the Palestinians	20%	20%

Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (85%)	2025 (90%)
Israel should not cooperate with the regional reconstruction process	45%	39%
Israel should allow and support international and regional efforts on the issue, but not take an active role	39%	45%
Israel should take an active role – making reconstruction a central goal in rebuilding its relations with regional states and the Palestinians	16%	16%

Multi-year comparison – Arab sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (72%)	2025 (71%)
Israel should not cooperate with the regional reconstruction process	15%	13%
Israel should allow and support international and regional efforts on the issue, but not take an active role	38%	39%
Israel should take an active role – making reconstruction a central goal in rebuilding its relations with regional states and the Palestinians	47%	48%

9. Trump’s 20-point plan, approved by the Government of Israel, includes the demilitarization and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, the deployment of an international force, and progress on a framework toward the establishment of a Palestinian state following reforms in the Palestinian Authority. Do you support or oppose this initiative?

Response	Total 2026	Jews	Arabs
Support	33%	30%	44%
Oppose	38%	42%	18%
No opinion	29%	28%	38%
Support-oppose gap	-5%	-12%	+26%

10. After two years of military fighting in the Gaza Strip, Hamas is still standing. In your view, what is the most effective way to defeat Hamas in the Gaza Strip?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (83%)	Jews (88%)	Arabs (62%)
Return to military fighting and occupy the entire Gaza Strip until all of the organization's capabilities are destroyed	32%	37%	6%	39%	43%	10%
Continue military, diplomatic, and economic pressure	16%	17%	13%	19%	19%	20%
Promote an alternative governing authority to Hamas under the Trump plan - a technocratic government combined with an assisting international force	23%	23%	26%	28%	26%	43%
Bring in international intervention forces instead of the IDF to demilitarize the Gaza Strip	12%	11%	17%	14%	12%	27%
No opinion	17%	12%	38%	-	-	-

11. Which strategic objective should the government pursue on the Palestinian issue?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (74%)	Jews (74%)	Arabs (69%)
Agreement on a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians within the framework of a regional normalization deal	25%	22%	41%	34%	29%	60%
Annexation and application of sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank	30%	33%	11%	40%	46%	16%
Continued conflict management under the current situation in Gaza and the West Bank	14%	15%	8%	19%	20%	11%
Establishment of one egalitarian democratic state from the river to the sea	5%	4%	9%	7%	5%	13%
No opinion	26%	26%	31%	-	-	-

12. The current Israeli government is pursuing two main efforts - legislation to change the judicial system and advancing annexation and the application of sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza. To what extent do you think these efforts are related?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (69%)	Jews (72%)	Arabs (58%)
Related to a very large extent	19%	19%	22%	28%	26%	37%
Related to quite a large extent	23%	24%	18%	33%	33%	32%
Slightly related	15%	16%	13%	22%	22%	22%
Almost or not at all related	12%	13%	5%	17%	19%	9%
No opinion	31%	28%	42%	-	-	-
Grouped: Related				61%	59%	69%
Grouped: Not related				39%	41%	31%

Multi-year comparison – by sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	Total		Jews		Arabs	
	2026 (69%)	2025 (79%)	2026 (72%)	2025 (82%)	2026 (58%)	2025 (64%)
Related	61%	64%	59%	63%	69%	73%
Not related	39%	36%	41%	37%	31%	27%

13. Several countries have imposed sanctions on violent settlers and on settler organizations that encourage violence in the territories. What is your position on such sanctions?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (78%)	Jews (80%)	Arabs (67%)
I support them	37%	34%	52%	48%	43%	78%
I oppose these sanctions	41%	46%	15%	52%	57%	22%
No opinion	22%	20%	33%	-	-	-
Support-oppose gap	-4%	-12%	+37%			

14. If the international community threatens to impose sanctions on banks in Israel because of their activity in the settlements - in a way that would harm the savings and credit of Israeli citizens - what do you think the banks should do?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (75%)	Jews (76%)	Arabs (68%)
The banks should ignore the threat and continue operating in the settlements, even at an economic cost to Israeli citizens	38%	43%	11%	51%	57%	15%
The banks should cease operations in the settlements, with the state compensating the settlers	13%	13%	16%	18%	17%	24%
I would prefer the banks to stop operating in the settlements without compensation for the settlements, in order to prevent harm to all Israeli citizens	17%	16%	21%	23%	21%	31%
I would support the international ultimatum and the decision by the banks to halt operations in the settlements	7%	4%	20%	8%	5%	30%
No opinion	25%	24%	32%	-	-	-

In previous surveys, the question was phrased slightly differently, but the response options were identical. The 2025 wording was: **If the international community requires banks in Israel to choose between continuing operations in the settlements and facing full international sanctions, what would your position be?**

Multi-year comparison – total sample, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (75%)	2025 (76%)
The banks should ignore the threat and continue operating in the settlements, even at an economic cost to Israeli citizens	51%	50%
The banks should cease operations in the settlements, with the state compensating the settlers	18%	18%
I would prefer the banks to stop operating in the settlements without compensation for the settlements, in order to prevent harm to all Israeli citizens	23%	23%
I would support the international ultimatum and the banks' decision to halt operations in the settlements	8%	9%

Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (75%)	2025 (79%)
The banks should ignore the threat and continue operating in the settlements, even at an economic cost to Israeli citizens	57%	56%
The banks should cease operations in the settlements, with the state compensating the settlers	17%	17%
I would prefer the banks to stop operating in the settlements without compensation for the settlers, in order to prevent harm to all Israeli citizens	21%	21%
I would support the international ultimatum and the banks' decision to halt operations in the settlements	5%	6%

Multi-year comparison – Arab sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026(68%)	2025(61%)
The banks should ignore the threat and continue operating in the settlements, even at an economic cost to Israeli citizens	15%	15%
The banks should cease operations in the settlements, with the state compensating the settlers	24%	19%
ehT ni gnitarepo pots ot sknab eht referp dluow I ni ,srelttes eht rof noitasnepmoc tuohtiw stnemelttes snezitic ilearsl lla ot mrah tneverp ot redro	31%	33%
I would support the international ultimatum and the banks' decision to halt operations in the settlements	30%	33%

15. The Middle East and the Mediterranean basin are among the world's regions most vulnerable to global warming. In other parts of the world, states have organized regional cooperation frameworks to address the climate crisis. How important is it in your view to establish a similar regional framework in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin? Please rate on a scale of 1–10, where 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.

Response	Total 2026	Grouped
1 - Not at all important	7%	9%
2	0%	
3	2%	
4	4%	13%
5	9%	
6	10%	28%
7	18%	
8	19%	50%
9	8%	
10 - Very important	23%	
Average 1-10	7.16	

Grouped by sector

Grouped by sector	Total	Jews	Arabs
1-3 Not important	9%	10%	5%
4-5 Not too important	13%	11%	20%
6-7 Quite important	28%	29%	23%
8-10 Important	50%	50%	52%
Average 1-10	7.16	7.13	7.30

16. To what extent do you think Israel should cooperate with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank in addressing urgent environmental issues (such as water, food, and pollution)?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (81%)	Jews (84%)	Arabs (65%)
To a great extent	21%	17%	42%	25%	19%	54%
To some extent	28%	29%	20%	32%	34%	24%
To a slight extent	15%	16%	10%	17%	18%	13%
Not at all	22%	26%	7%	26%	29%	9%
No opinion	14%	12%	21%			
Grouped: To a very great extent + To some extent				57%	53%	78%
Grouped: To a slight extent + Not at all				43%	47%	22%

Multi-year comparison – total sample, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (81%)	2025 (89%)
To a great extent + To some extent	57%	54%
To a slight extent + Not at all	43%	46%

Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (84%)	2025 (92%)
To a great extent + To some extent	53%	49%
To a slight extent + Not at all	47%	51%

Multi-year comparison – Arab sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (65%)	2025 (79%)
To a great extent + To some extent	78%	82%
To a slight extent + Not at all	22%	18%

3. Israel and Regional Actors

17. In your view, how has the war in Gaza, the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and the continued confrontation with Hamas affected Israel's relations with Arab countries?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (81%)	Jews (82%)	Arabs (74%)
The continued confrontation endangers Israel's relations with its allies and the future of normalization	32%	29%	45%	39%	35%	61%
The continued confrontation is not expected to significantly affect Israel's relations with Arab states	26%	27%	20%	32%	33%	27%
The continued confrontation and the struggle against Hamas will strengthen Israel's relations with the Arab world and increase Arab willingness for normalization	23%	26%	9%	29%	32%	12%
No opinion	19%	18%	26%	-	-	-
No opinion	14%	12%	21%			
Grouped: To a very great extent + To some extent				57%	53%	78%
Grouped: To a slight extent + Not at all				43%	47%	22%

Last year, the question was phrased slightly differently, as the war in Gaza had not yet ended; the response options were unchanged.

Multi-year comparison – total sample, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (81%)	2025 (86%)
The continued confrontation endangers Israel's relations with its allies and the future of normalization	39%	45%
The continued confrontation is not expected to significantly affect Israel's relations with Arab states	32%	26%
The continued confrontation and the struggle against Hamas will strengthen Israel's relations with the Arab world and increase Arab willingness for normalization	29%	29%

Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (82%)	2025 (89%)
The continued confrontation endangers Israel's relations with its allies and the future of normalization	35%	42%
The continued confrontation is not expected to significantly affect Israel's relations with Arab states	33%	27%
The continued confrontation and the struggle against Hamas will strengthen Israel's relations with the Arab world and increase Arab willingness for normalization	32%	31%

Multi-year comparison – Arab sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (74%)	2025 (70%)
The continued confrontation endangers Israel's relations with its allies and the future of normalization	61%	64%
The continued confrontation is not expected to significantly affect Israel's relations with Arab states	27%	21%
The continued confrontation and the struggle against Hamas will strengthen Israel's relations with the Arab world and increase Arab willingness for normalization	12%	15%

18. In your view, how has the war with Iran affected Israel's normalization process with the Gulf states?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (81%)	Jews (83%)	Arabs (73%)
The war with Iran has reduced Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	17%	15%	30%	21%	18%	41%
The war with Iran has not significantly changed the motivation of Arab states to pursue normalization with Israel	27%	27%	27%	34%	33%	37%
The war with Iran has increased Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	37%	41%	16%	45%	49%	22%
No opinion	19%	17%	27%	-	-	-
No opinion	14%	12%	21%			
Grouped: To a very great extent + To some extent				57%	53%	78%
Grouped: To a slight extent + Not at all				43%	47%	22%

Multi-year comparison – total sample, among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (81%)	2025 (81%)
The war with Iran has reduced Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	21%	16%
The war with Iran has not significantly changed the motivation of Arab states to pursue normalization with Israel	34%	36%
The war with Iran has increased Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	45%	48%

Multi-year comparison – total sample, among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (83%)	2025 (85%)
The war with Iran has reduced Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	18%	13%
The war with Iran has not significantly changed the motivation of Arab states to pursue normalization with Israel	33%	35%
The war with Iran has increased Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	49%	52%










Multi-year comparison – Arab sector, grouped among respondents with an opinio

	2026 (73%)	2025 (70%)
The war with Iran has reduced Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	41%	34%
The war with Iran has not significantly changed the motivation of Arab states to pursue normalization with Israel	37%	46%
The war with Iran has increased Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	22%	20%










19. Saudi leaders recently declared that any progress in normalization with Israel will depend on progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Do you support advancing normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia under these conditions?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (80%)	Jews (82%)	Arabs (69%)
Support normalization with Saudi Arabia as part of my support for a two-state solution	21%	18%	35%	26%	22%	50%
Support advancing steps to lower friction between Israelis and Palestinians, such as dismantling outposts in the West Bank, in order to advance normalization with the Saudis	20%	19%	23%	25%	23%	34%
Oppose normalization with Saudi Arabia if it includes any concession on the Palestinian issue	32%	38%	6%	40%	46%	9%
Oppose normalization with Saudi Arabia	7%	7%	5%	9%	9%	7%
No opinion	20%	18%	31%	-	-	-

20. Which two Middle Eastern countries do you consider most important to Israel? (Up to two countries could be named, among the 62% who named any country.)

Country	Total (62%)	Jews (65%)	Arabs (51%)
 Egypt	51.4%	51.8%	48.6%
 United Arab Emirates	33.2%	34.5%	25.0%
 Jordan	29.9%	29.1%	34.7%
 Saudi Arabia	26.5%	26.8%	25.0%
 Lebanon	7.4%	7.9%	4.2%
 Turkey	6.2%	5.2%	12.5%
 Iran	5.2%	5.4%	4.2%
 Syria	3.7%	3.8%	2.8%
 Qatar	3.5%	3.4%	4.2%

Multi-year comparison – total sample, among those who named any country

		2026 (62%)	2025 (66%)	2024 (73%)
 Egypt	↓	51.4%	63.5%	62.9%
 United Arab Emirates	↑	33.2%	12.5%	15.6%
 Jordan	↓	29.9%	44.2%	52.3%
 Saudi Arabia	↑	26.5%	22.4%	27.5%
 Lebanon	↑	7.4%	6.3%	3.1%
 Turkey	↑	6.2%	6.0%	1.8%
 Iran	↑	5.2%	3.5%	1.9%
 Syria	↓	3.7%	7.8%	1.2%
 Qatar	↓	3.5%	4.5%	3.1%

21. The crisis in relations between Israel and Jordan deepened this year, and recently the King of Jordan refused Netanyahu's request to meet. How important is it in your view to restore relations with Jordan? Please rate on a scale of 1-10 where 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.

Response	Total 2026	Grouped
1 - Not at all important	6%	8%
2	1%	
3	1%	
4	3%	10%
5	7%	
6	9%	24%
7	15%	
8	22%	58%
9	10%	
10 - Very important	26%	
Average 1-10	7.42	

Grouped by sector

Grouped by sector	Total	Jews	Arabs
1-3 Not important	8%	8%	4%
4-5 Not too important	10%	9%	17%
6-7 Quite important	24%	24%	25%
8-10 Important	58%	59%	54%
Average 1-10	7.42	7.41	7.47

Multi-year comparison – total sample

Grouped by sector	2026	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021
1-3 Not important	8%	7%	8%	4%	7.7	7.1
4-5 Not too important	10%	10%	11%	9%	11.3	11.6
6-7 Quite important	24%	25%	21%	24%	23.4	23.9
8-10 Important	58%	58%	60%	63%	57.6	57.3
Average 1-10	7.42	7.56	7.57	7.82	7.46	7.50

Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector

Grouped by sector	2026	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021
1-3 Not important	8%	7%	8%	4%	7.6	6.7
4-5 Not too important	9%	10%	9%	8%	10.8	11.7
6-7 Quite important	24%	25%	22%	25%	24.8	25
8-10 Important	59%	58%	61%	63%	56.9	56.6
Average 1-10	7.41	7.55	7.69	7.76	7.46	7.49

Multi-year comparison – Arab sector

Grouped by sector	2026	2025	2024	2023	2022
1-3 Not important	4%	6%	11%	2%	8.6
4-5 Not too important	17%	10%	22%	12%	14.8
6-7 Quite important	25%	28%	17%	13%	14.8
8-10 Important	54%	56%	50%	73%	61.7
Average 1-10	7.47	7.60	6.96	8.21	7.47

22. Do you regard the EU today as more of a friend or more of an adversary to Israel?

Response	Total 2026	Jews	Arabs
More of a friend to Israel	14%	12%	24%
More of an adversary to Israel	67%	72%	42%
No opinion	19%	16%	34%
Friend-adversary gap	-53%	-60%	-18%

Multi-year comparison – total sample

	2026	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
More of a friend to Israel	14%	14%	23%	33%	33.3	24.4	29%	27%	18%
More of an adversary to Israel	67%	67%	54%	39%	40.4	46	43%	45%	55%
No opinion	19%	19%	23%	28%	26.3	29.6	28%	28%	27%

Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector

	2026	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
More of a friend to Israel	12%	14%	19%	31%	29.9	22.2	27%	24%	16%
More of an adversary to Israel	72%	71%	60%	42%	44.9	50.8	48%	51%	61%
No opinion	16%	15%	21%	27%	25.2	27	25%	25%	23%
Friend-adversary gap	-60%	-57%	-41%	-11%	-15	-28.6	-21%	-27%	-45%

Multi-year comparison – Arab sector

	2026	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
More of a friend to Israel	24%	14%	39%	45%	52.9	36.9	39%
More of an adversary to Israel	42%	46%	29%	21%	14.1	19	19%
No opinion	34%	40%	32%	34%	33	44	42%
Friend-adversary gap	-18%	-32%	+10%	+24%	+38.8	+17.9	+20%

23. Do you regard Germany today as more of a friend or more of an adversary to Israel?

	Total 2026	Jews	Arabs
More of a friend to Israel	64%	67%	49%
More of an adversary to Israel	18%	17%	21%
No opinion	18%	16%	30%
Friend-adversary gap	+46%	+50%	+28%

4. Israeli Strategy toward Iran, Syria, and Lebanon

24. In 2018, under pressure from Prime Minister Netanyahu, the Trump administration decided to withdraw from the nuclear agreement with Iran and shift to a path of economic and military pressure on the Iranian regime. Since then, Iran has made significant progress toward obtaining nuclear weapons. Looking back, do you think it was right to withdraw from the nuclear agreement?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs
Right	31%	34%	13%
Not right	37%	36%	44%
Do not know	32%	30%	44%
Right-not right gap	-6%	-2%	-31%

25. What should the main Israeli-American strategy toward Iran be at present?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (83%)	Jews (87%)	Arabs (70%)
Return to a full-scale war until the regime is overthrown	42%	49%	11%	50%	56%	15%
Return to war in order to achieve a better agreement with the Iranian regime	15%	17%	8%	18%	19%	11%
Conflict management: a policy of recurring rounds of escalation in response to hostile Iranian actions	10%	9%	15%	12%	11%	21%
Military action has run its course; Israel should act to reach an agreement with Iran	16%	12%	38%	20%	14%	53%
No opinion	17%	13%	30%	-	-	-

26. Israel recently announced the establishment of a new security zone in southern Lebanon to protect northern communities. To what extent do you think it serves the long-term security of the residents of the north? Please rate on a scale of 1–10, where 10 means serves very much and 1 means does not serve at all.

Response	Total among respondents with an opinion (94%)	Grouped
1 - Not at all important	13%	21%
2	3%	
3	5%	
4	4%	16%
5	12%	
6	11%	23%
7	12%	
8	15%	40%
9	8%	
10 - Very important	17%	
Average 1-10	6.15	

Grouped by sector

Grouped by sector	Total	Jews	Arabs
1-3 Does not serve at all	21%	18%	40%
4-5 Does not serve	16%	16%	16%
6-7 Serves quite a bit	23%	24%	20%
8-10 Serves	40%	42%	24%
Average 1-10	6.15	6.43	4.71

27. In your view, can Hezbollah be disarmed, and if so, what should be the central component of the strategy for disarming Hezbollah?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (86%)	Jews (89%)	Arabs (69%)	Total among respondents with an opinion, excluding "not realistic" (71%)
Continued Israeli military pressure and action	30%	34%	8%	35%	39%	12%	42%
Strengthening the Lebanese government and the Lebanese army with international assistance	17%	17%	16%	19%	19%	23%	24%
Regional and international pressure by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states	24%	25%	18%	28%	28%	26%	34%
Disarming Hezbollah is not a realistic objective in the near future	15%	13%	27%	18%	14%	39%	-
No opinion	14%	11%	31%	-	-	-	-

28. Syrian President al-Sharaa recently declared his desire to reach a security agreement with Israel in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from Syria. What should the position of the Israeli government be toward the al-Sharaa regime in Damascus?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (75%)	Jews (76%)	Arabs (65%)
The al-Sharaa regime endangers Israel and its allies. Israel should act militarily to topple it	12%	12%	9%	16%	16%	14%
Continue the current policy of military response to threats and maintaining an Israeli presence inside Syrian territory	28%	31%	12%	37%	40%	18%
Promote a temporary security arrangement - withdrawal from Syrian territory in exchange for demilitarizing the border area and guarantees for the safety of the Druze minority in Syria	13%	13%	13%	17%	17%	20%
Promote a long-term political and economic agreement with the al-Sharaa government to reshape Israel-Syria relations	22%	20%	31%	30%	27%	48%
No opinion	25%	24%	35%	-	-	-

*Total among respondents with an opinion.

In the previous survey, the question was phrased slightly differently, while the response options were unchanged.

Multi-year comparison – total sample, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (75%)	2025 (79%)
The al-Sharaa regime endangers Israel and its allies. Israel should act militarily to topple it	16%	26%
Continue the current policy of military responses to threats and maintaining an Israeli presence inside Syrian territory	37%	33%
Promote a temporary security arrangement – withdrawal from Syrian territory in exchange for the demilitarization of the border area and guarantees for the safety of the Druze minority in Syria	17%	12%
Promote a long-term political and economic agreement with the al-Sharaa government to reshape Israel-Syria relations	30%	29%

Multi-year comparison – Jewish sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (76%)	2025 (80%)
The al-Sharaa regime endangers Israel and its allies. Israel should act militarily to topple it	16%	26%
Continue the current policy of military responses to threats and maintaining an Israeli presence inside Syrian territory	40%	36%
Promote a temporary security arrangement – withdrawal from Syrian territory in exchange for the demilitarization of the border area and guarantees for the safety of the Druze minority in Syria	17%	10%
Promote a long-term political and economic agreement with the al-Sharaa government to reshape Israel-Syria relations	27%	28%

Multi-year comparison – Arab sector, grouped among respondents with an opinion

	2026 (65%)	2025 (71%)
The al-Sharaa regime endangers Israel and its allies. Israel should act militarily to topple it	14%	27%
Continue the current policy of military responses to threats and maintaining an Israeli presence inside Syrian territory	18%	14%
Promote a temporary security arrangement – withdrawal from Syrian territory in exchange for the demilitarization of the border area and guarantees for the safety of the Druze minority in Syria	20%	24%
Promote a long-term political and economic agreement with the al-Sharaa government to reshape Israel-Syria relations	48%	35%

29. What should be Israel's preferred strategy toward Turkey?

Response	Total	Jews	Arabs	Total among respondents with an opinion (82%)	Jews (83%)	Arabs (72%)
Turkey is a regional power of strategic importance to Israel. Israel should act to renew cooperation with Turkey and strive to restore relations with it	18%	13%	39%	22%	16%	55%
Turkey is an adversary of Israel, but the two countries share common interests. Israel should renew dialogue with Turkey in order to reach understandings in key arenas such as Syria and Iran	36%	39%	22%	44%	47%	30%
Turkey is a hostile state and a security threat to Israel. Israel should curb its influence in the region, even at the cost of escalation and deterioration in relations between the countries	28%	31%	11%	34%	37%	15%
No opinion	18%	17%	28%	-	-	-

The Israeli Foreign Policy Index 2026



Findings of the Mitvim
Institute Survey

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