



MITVIM
The Israeli Institute for
Regional Foreign Policies

From Endless Wars to Long Term Security:

A Diplomatic Plan
for a New Government

The Mitvim Institute | October 2026

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A Diplomatic Plan for a New Government

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¹ **Mitvim** is a research and policy institute working to ensure the existence, prosperity, and well-being of the State of Israel by promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace, integrating Israel into its surrounding regions, and improving Israel's foreign-policy system and standing in the world. The Mitvim team who prepared these policy-recommendations for the new government included Dr. Omer Zanany, Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Bar Rapoport, Eitan Ishai, Liel Maghen, Daniella Armoni, and Reef Yitzhaki. The following also participated in the discussions and contributed their insights: Dr. Nimrod Goren, Nadav Tamir, Prof. Elie Podeh, Dr. Udi Eran, Yitzhak Gal, former ambassador Michael Harari, former MK Ksenia Svetlova, Ido Dembin, Noa Shusterman Dvir, Col. (res.) Udi Evental, former ambassador Rodica Radian-Gordon, and former ambassador Irit Lillian. Edited by Dr. Roei Kibrik and Dr. Gil Murciano.

We thank our partners in this process at Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Israel (FES), as well as our partners at the Berl Katznelson Foundation, with whom we collaborate through the Joint Peace and Security Policy Unit.

Contents

- 1. Principles of the New Diplomacy-Centered Security Doctrine 9
- 2. Principal Efforts and Steps for the First 100 Days 11
 - 1. Israel and the Palestinian Arena 11
 - 2. Israel in the Middle East 17
 - 3. Restoring the Strategic Alliance with the United States 23
 - 4. Israel and Europe 25
 - 5. Israel's Foreign-Policy Establishment 28
- 3. A Possible Choreography for the Next Government's
First 100 Days.....30

The new government taking office after the upcoming elections will need to enact **bold, far-reaching security and foreign policy shifts from its very first day**. From the outset, it will face urgent decision-making junctures. The future of the Gaza Strip and implementation of Trump's 15 points Plan, the active fronts in Lebanon and Syria, the international diplomatic and security campaign vis-à-vis Iran, and the U.S. midterm elections – are just some of the major developments on which policy must be formulated early in the term. These challenges will be compounded by **significant domestic political constraints**, including a strong and highly-committed pack of political spoilers. To shape a new reality of deep security for Israel's citizens and begin the work of diplomatic rehabilitation, any new government will have no choice but to confront these challenges.

The government is set to begin from a difficult position. Israel's response to the October 7 massacre, and the military campaigns that followed in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, have brought its relations with the region and the world to an unprecedented low, severely damaging both its security and its international legitimacy. **The doctrine of “peace through strength” – the illusion that the Middle East can be reshaped through military force alone – has culminated in a situation of dangerous strategic inferiority.** Israel has demonstrated impressive military capabilities, but it has failed to convert temporary operational gains into lasting diplomatic achievements. Moreover, its strategic failure has deepened as **its ability to influence the regional decisions and processes that shape the fate and security of its citizens has steadily diminished**. Partners and adversaries alike view Israel as a dangerous and irresponsible actor – a “natural spoiler” – and it is therefore excluded from the critical processes now rebuilding the regional order.

The government's refusal to discuss proposed diplomatic plans – let alone propose any initiatives for resolving the various conflicts – has enabled the organizations and actors that threaten Israel in Gaza, Lebanon, and, to some extent, Syria to recuperate, regroup and regain strength. Hezbollah is working to rebuild its power in Lebanon, while Hamas controls Gaza and, thanks to the humanitarian crisis and the absence of a governing alternative, is replenishing its ranks among hungry young Gazans. Over all

looms the collapse of the peace-through-strength doctrine in the latest campaign in Iran. The illusion that military force could bring Iran's citizens into the streets and produce dramatic regime change overnight led Israel to initiate a campaign that has damaged its strategic relationship with the United States, its international standing, and, above all, autonomy over its own decision making in matters of national security.

In the international arena, Israel is sliding toward **pariah-state status**. Public support for Israel in U.S. and European opinion polls has fallen to unprecedented lows; boycotts and sanctions by governments and private bodies are growing; senior Israeli officials are barred from entering key countries because of international arrest warrants or sanctions; Israeli academia is suffering an ongoing decline in external research grants; political elites across the Western world are increasingly challenging the State of Israel's right to exist; and Israel's place among Western democracies is in doubt.

A diplomatic and security change of course begins first and foremost with a **conceptual shift in Israel's security doctrine – it requires nothing less than reframing the meaning of security**. This requires developing a new diplomatic-based security doctrine that rebalances military operations and diplomatic initiatives. Statecraft and diplomacy must be institutionalized as the “fifth pillar” of Israel's national security doctrine.

Israel's government will need to **demonstrate a clear change of course that restores both domestic and international confidence**. Unlike previous governments, **the burden of proof will rest this time on the new government**. Without real change – including concrete steps in the West Bank and in Gaza – it will be very difficult to halt Israel's slide toward pariah-state status, rebuild its special relationship with the United States and the Western world, restore Israeli diplomatic initiative, and reposition Israel as a leading partner in shaping the Middle East's new regional architecture. The next government will have to find a way to “close” the active war fronts and, where possible, transition to diplomatic arrangements that provide its citizens with long-term security.

If it advances these objectives, Israel's next government will be able to **seize historic opportunities** arising out of recent developments. These include opportunities to significantly weaken Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank and Hezbollah in Lebanon by supporting political alternatives to their rule; the opportunity to forge new relationships with former enemies in the north; and economic and diplomatic opportunities arising from the disruption of maritime trade routes in the wake of the Iran campaign, which could enable Israel to join new regional connectivity initiatives.

Progress in the Palestinian arena is essential to achieving a diplomatic change of course in every arena discussed above. Israel's next government will stand at a critical crossroads. The right decisions can transform the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a strategic liability pulling Israel toward a one-state reality and weakening its global standing into a key component in securing its citizens' long-term security and strengthening the State of Israel's national resilience.

This paper outlines the policy directions and steps that the new government should adopt in the diplomatic and national security arenas during its first 100 days. Some of these steps can be taken immediately, others require prior constructive processes to lay the ground.

The intention of the paper is to bring about a change in policy, not advocate for a political change. The concern is the policy of the State of Israel, not which politicians or what party advance it. Accordingly, nothing should be construed as a recommendation to vote for any particular party or political actor. The paper is relevant to any future government, regardless of partisan political identity, willing to take the necessary steps to reverse the present slide into a diplomatic and security abyss.

The paper seeks not only to list the issues on which the government must act but also to **connect the dots** – to trace the synergistic, intertwined, and carefully sequenced series of moves in the various arenas generated by a diplomatic change of course for Israel. The final section proposes **a diplomatic choreography: a coordinated sequence of steps whose**

implementation would improve Israel's diplomatic standing and strengthen its security resilience within 100 days of the government's inauguration. Adopting these recommendations would yield significant achievements from the outset of the new government's term and provide important momentum for the rest of its tenure.

1. Principles of the New Diplomacy-Centered Security Doctrine

At the beginning of its term, the new government will launch a series of **political-diplomatic initiatives** that fundamentally change **Israel's strategic reality**:

- **From an isolated state to an indispensable strategic asset** for the United States, Europe, and the region – and an active partner in shaping the Middle East's new regional architecture.
- **From a spoiler** whose positions are ignored and submits to dictates, **to engagement in rebuilding the “special relationship” with the United States.**
- From simultaneity managing multiple active fronts to taking **political-diplomatic initiative** and, where possible, shaping arrangements designed to end active hostilities.
- From a reality in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitutes a strategic burden threatening Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic state to turning the conflict into a strategic lever for securing Israel's resilience, identity, and prosperity.
- From the rogue of the region to **a member of a regional coalition of builders.** Active Israeli involvement in regional reconstruction – in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria – is a central tool for influencing the emerging regional landscape and a basis for a renewed strategic partnership with the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan, and the U.S. administration.

This transformation in Israel's strategic mindset requires adopting statecraft, diplomacy and political settlement as core components of national security alongside military might. This accompanies a shift of focus from tactical response to immediate threats toward a **“deep security” approach that shapes the strategic reality in which these threats emerge in the first place.** The doctrine includes the following principal components:

- **Influencing underlying processes in Israel's neighboring countries:** engagement, partnership, and influence in the political, economic, and civic processes shaping the countries bordering Israel, with the aim of strengthening moderate leaders, constructing frameworks for ongoing cooperation and preventing future threats from emerging. A prominent example is Israeli potential involvement in reconstruction in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria – a process that in any case must affect its own national security for years to come.
- **Initiating strategic dialogue with regional partners and adversaries:** establishing continuous, direct channels of communication with all Middle Eastern actors – particularly adversaries – in order to set red lines, prevent unintended escalations, and identify shared interests.
- **Advancing political settlements in conflict arenas:** translating military achievements on the battlefield into stable, long-term diplomatic achievement of strategic resolution that diminishes the opportunities for recurrent rounds of fighting.
- **Active participation in multilateral regional frameworks:** leveraging Israel's geographic, security, economic, and technological advantages to help establish and build regional coalitions.
- **Integrating the diplomatic dimension into the decision making and strategic planning processes on the core issues of Israel's national security:** ensuring that diplomatic thinking is represented at the decision-making table from the earliest planning stages among professional staff, and that every military step aims to achieve clear purpose.
- **Practice that shapes political reality – changing facts on the ground as a means to gradually promote peacemaking:** advancing and implementing game-changing projects that support institution-building, cooperation, trust, a healthy economy, and environmental stewardship. These are the tools of bottom-up peacebuilding that create the reality on which the diplomatic agreements of the future are built.

2. Principal Efforts and Steps for the First 100 Days

1. Israel and the Palestinian Arena

A change in Israel's policy in the Palestinian arena is neither political gesture nor reward but **strategic and existential necessity**, an essential security precondition, and the **central fulcrum for Israel's ability to move forward in every other sphere**.

Effort
1

Lead the Implementation of President Trump's 20-Point Plan in the Gaza Strip

Israel's government will take the initiative and lead the implementation of the plan through a systemic approach designed to defeat Hamas and establish a moderate, and stable Palestinian governing alternative.

Key concrete steps:

- **Adopt a government resolution reaffirming Israel's commitment to implementing the plan on the ground**, including Points 19 and 20, which guarantee gradual progress toward a two-state solution.
- **Enable building a governing alternative to Hamas in Gaza:** implement the plan in a manner that ensures the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and the dismantling of Hamas by introducing a credible alternative government in Gaza based on the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), the International Stabilization Forces (ISF), and an International Verification and monitoring Force (IVC). This framework will include authorizing NCAG to enter Gaza; holding an official working meeting between Israel's Minister of Defense and the head of the committee; preparing a framework for coordinating the collection of Hamas's heavy weapons and dismantling its tunnel and production systems; and

transferring directly to the committee the clearance revenues designated for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza.

- **Dismantle Hamas's armed and governing presence on the ground:** the government will work with the "Gaza Executive Board" to implement the "15-Point Plan" of July 31, 2026. Implementation will abolish Hamas's military frameworks, disarm the organization, and sever it from its economic resources. Once the demilitarization process has been carried out, the government will instruct the IDF to adopt a defensive posture around the Gaza border communities, implementing the lessons of October 7. The government will ensure that the IDF retains freedom to operate in order to thwart threats in the Gaza Strip.²
- **Reconstruction:** in addition to ensuring the necessary humanitarian assistance, the government will allow reconstruction in the Gaza Strip to proceed with the support and funding of the "Gaza Executive Board." This will enable the construction of functioning state institutions and further deradicalization. Reconstruction will advance subject to full Palestinian compliance with Israel's security requirements. **A dedicated mechanism will be established within the National Security Council to coordinate strategic reconstruction efforts in Gaza** and leverage Israeli capabilities as a logistical and infrastructure base. Reconstruction and the disarmament of Hamas will be synchronized to establish the grounds of a political alternative to Hamas.

² Hamas Continues to Consolidate Its Position Under the Netanyahu Government: Israel Must Adopt an Organized Plan to "Dry Up" Its Funding / Yitzhak Gal (August 2026).

Effort 2 Stabilize the West Bank through a Fundamental Change in Israel's Approach to the Palestinian Authority

Key concrete steps:

- **Deepen and upgrade security coordination** with the Palestinian security services in order to prevent Hamas from gaining influence in the West Bank. This will include:
- Establishing a **joint task force** – trilateral with Jordan and assisted by the United States – **to prevent Iranian arms smuggling along the Jordan River.**
- Establishing a **de-escalation mechanism for Jerusalem's Holy Basin** together with the Palestinian Authority and Jordan.³
- **Preventing the financial collapse of the Palestinian Authority.** Steps must include the immediate release and regular transfer to the PA of withheld Palestinian clearance revenues, subject to continued structural and civic reforms; permitting Palestinian workers to enter Israel subject to security approval; issuing permanent indemnity notices to Israeli commercial banks that conduct business with Palestinians; and resolving the problem of excess cash in the Palestinian market.⁴
- Holding **professional meetings** between Israeli government ministries – health, environmental protection, and agriculture – and their **Palestinian Authority counterparts.**
- Israel will **facilitate elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and presidency** in accordance with previous agreements and commitments between Israel and the PLO. The government will **enable East Jerusalem residents to vote freely**, expand freedom of movement in the West Bank and Gaza, and permit international observers to monitor the integrity of the elections – all while ensuring public order and security in every sector.

3 All Eyes on the Temple Mount, with the Match in Hand / Dr. Lior Lehrs (November 2022).

4 Saving the Palestinian Economy Will Push Back Hamas and Provide Security for Israel / Yitzhak Gal (January 2026).

- **Advance practical steps to build a two-state reality and strengthen Palestinian state capacity** in view of the consolidation of a one-state reality:
 - Approve specific, targeted **master plans** for civilian development in **Area C**.
 - Resume the work of the **Joint Water Committee**.
 - Approve and support projects for independent power stations and solar infrastructure in order to increase **Palestinian energy independence in the West Bank** and reduce pressure on Israel's electricity system.⁵
 - Adopt a government resolution establishing a **joint waste authority**, with dedicated bodies responsible for waste treatment in the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
 - Adopt a government resolution recognizing the Palestinian Energy Authority and the **Palestinian electricity** company as authorized to **manage the transmission system** and examine transferring planning powers in Area C to the Palestinian Authority for strategic infrastructure projects. All as part of reducing pressure on the electricity grid and improving Israel's energy security.

Effort 3

Rolling Back Annexation and a One-State Reality

Key concrete steps:

- **Revoke the transfer of civil and legal administrative authorities in the West Bank to civilian bodies and reassign these authorities to the Head of the IDF Central Command and COGAT.**
- **Dismantle and evacuate illegal outposts:** this step would send a clear message that the new government respects the rule of law and signal a policy change to the Palestinians and the international community.
- **Freeze construction measures that endanger the future feasibility of the two-state solution:** the Security Cabinet should publicly freeze and

⁵ Energy as a Tool for Advancing Israeli-Palestinian Peace / Bar Rapoport (March 2022).

reassess construction plans in areas of high sensitivity – especially E1 and Gi'vat HaMatos – and completely halt the development and legalization of agricultural farms and unauthorized outposts on the ground.

- **Refocus national investment on infrastructure inside Israel and redirect to that purpose investments previously channeled to the West Bank:** halt budget-intensive transportation and energy infrastructure projects intended exclusively for settlers and formulate a new map of interests defining priority areas within Israel's sovereign borders.
- **Restore law and public order in the West Bank:** orders from the Security Cabinet should direct the IDF, Israel Police, and Israel Security Agency to act decisively against violent settlers and Jewish terrorism.
- **Revoke the existing land-registration arrangement** that grants Israel sovereign authority to regulate and register land in the occupied territories and end the political-diplomatic use of declarations concerning **nature reserves and parks.**

Effort 4 Mobilize Regional Actors and Development Plans to Stabilize the West Bank and Rebuild Gaza

Key concrete steps:

- Promote and support the **inclusion of Palestinian representatives in the working groups of the Negev Forum 2.0** (see the next section) – and in **IMEC** (India-Middle East – Europe Corridor), as a means of strengthening Israel's standing in these frameworks.
- Mobilize moderate regional states to finance, oversee, and support **large-scale civilian and infrastructure projects in the West Bank and Gaza**, such as power stations and solar fields in Area C.⁶
- Support and participate in establishing an **international civilian-security administration and monitoring mechanism at the Rafah crossing and in southern Gaza, coordinated with Israel's defense establishment.** The

⁶ The Day After the 2023 Gaza War: Building Economic and State Infrastructure in Gaza as Part of an Israeli-Palestinian Arrangement in the Context of Regional Cooperation / Yitzhak Gal (November 2023).

mechanism would include Egypt, the European Union through EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah), the United Arab Emirates, and local and international professionals.⁷

- Initiate cooperation with the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia to establish a **multinational financial fund that support Gaza's reconstruction**, with resources disbursed in parallel with gradual disarmament.⁸

7 A "Revitalized" EUBAM Rafah? One Avenue for the EU's Involvement in the "Day After" in Gaza / Hadas Lorber (February 2025).

8 Financing the Sustainable Reconstruction of Gaza / Dr. Hafez Ghanem and Liel Maghen (April 2026).

2. Israel in the Middle East

In the post-October 7 reality, the need for cooperation with the countries of the region has transformed from a diplomatic and economic matter into a **core component of Israel's national security**. Regional states – especially the Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan – are deeply involved in shaping the principal arenas affecting Israel's national security: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran. The new government's task is to halt Israel's growing regional isolation, change the perception of Israel as a dangerous and unrestrained actor, and become a partner in shaping the strategic regional processes that will affect its own security. Policy changes in the Palestinian arena should be leveraged to renew diplomatic partnership with regional states. At the same time, the consequences of the war with Iran demonstrate the strategic importance of developing regional connectivity and trade corridors such as IMEC, building regional coalitions to contain Iran, and seizing the opportunity for Israel to become a central actor within these efforts.

Effort
1

Advance Conditional Framework Agreements with Lebanon and Syria and Strengthen their State Sovereignty⁹

Key concrete steps in Syria:

- **Issue an official government statement** clarifying that Israel **respects Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity**, so long as Syria remains committed to preventing immediate and future threats to Israel from its territory.
- **Sign a security agreement with the Syrian government** that includes demilitarization arrangements in the south; restrictions on rebuilding strategic military capabilities that threaten Israel – especially nonconventional weapons, surface-to-surface missiles, UAVs, and air

⁹ Coordination Under Constraint: Building Israeli-Syrian Security Mechanisms in a Fragmented Regional Environment / Eitan Ishai (May 2026).

defenses; guarantees for the safety of the Druze community; and a phased framework for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1974 separation-of-forces lines, subject to compliance with agreed milestones.

- Establish an **Israeli-Syrian military cooperation mechanism to isolate Hezbollah and prevent renewed Iranian entrenchment in Syria**. The mechanism would address the smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah through Syria and the sealing of the Syrian-Lebanese border.
- Establish an **ongoing strategic dialogue with Syria** at a senior professional level for diplomatic coordination, de-escalation, and the advancement of infrastructure projects on the ground.
- Establish an **executive administration in southern Syria**, based on the “Good Neighbor” model, to **advance cross-border civilian, medical, and infrastructure cooperation**, with Jordan serving as mediator, partner, and logistical base.
- Promote an internationally-led cooperation mechanism with Israeli and Syrian participation to **locate and dismantle the remnants of Syria’s nonconventional weapons stockpiles**.

Key concrete steps in Lebanon:

- **Issue an official government statement** clarifying that Israel **respects Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity**, so long as the Lebanese government remains committed to preventing immediate and future threats to Israel from its territory and to implementing its decisions to disarm Hezbollah.
- **Develop a phased, conditional framework for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon**. The framework will sequence withdrawal with the gradual dismantling of Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities, the consolidation of the Lebanese Armed Forces and state institutions in the south, and measures to prevent the organization from rearming. The framework will define clear, measurable milestones for reciprocal implementation. In its first stage, it will focus on dismantling strategic weapons and capabilities that directly threaten Israel – including precision-guided and long-range missiles and rockets, UAVs, and production and storage

infrastructure – while blocking arms transfers from Syria and Iran.

- Upgrade the existing U.S.-sponsored dialogue mechanism into a **permanent, operational Israeli-Lebanese channel at the defense-minister level**. This would serve as the framework for negotiating the plan and overseeing its implementation. It would establish coordination and monitoring mechanisms, assess reciprocal steps against compliance with milestones, and advance additional security and diplomatic issues between the two countries.
- Launch an initiative to formulate an **agreement demarcating the land border between Israel and Lebanon**, in coordination with Syria and with U.S. support. This would strengthen the public standing of the Aoun-Salam government vis-à-vis Hezbollah and undermine Hezbollah's public legitimacy for attacking Israel.
- **Launch a civilian-security pilot in southern Lebanon to strengthen state governance**. Local reconstruction would be conditional on removing Hezbollah, dismantling its presence and weapons on the ground, and transferring control to Lebanese state institutions.

Effort 2 **Restore and Fortify the Peace Alliances**

Key concrete steps:

- **The prime minister will make an official visit to Cairo and meet with Egypt's president**. During the visit, the prime minister will publicly emphasize the importance of peace with Egypt as well as Egypt's unique role as a mediator and partner in Gaza and in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- Establish a **permanent Israeli-Egyptian strategic dialogue** at the national-security-adviser level on **stabilizing and rebuilding the Gaza Strip**. The dialogue will focus on coordinating the transition to Palestinian rule as an alternative to Hamas, security arrangements and the prevention of smuggling, operation of the Rafah crossing, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, and the mobilization of regional and

international partners.

- Issue a public statement emphasizing Israel's commitment to its **strategic partnership with Jordan**, Jordan's role in reducing tensions in the West Bank and at the Holy Basin, and preservation of the status quo.
- Convene a meeting of the Jordanian and Israeli energy ministers to **relaunch the water-for-energy exchange initiative, Blue Green Prosperity**, alongside a meeting of the foreign ministers to **relaunch the Jordan Gateway project**.
- **Update and formalize Jordan's water allocations**, return to the November 2022 water agreement between Israel and Jordan, and relaunch cooperation to rehabilitate the Jordan River.
- **Upgrade the inter-state border crossings**, including extending opening hours, adding operating days, and streamlining passage procedures.
- **Restore Israel's diplomatic representation in Jordan and Egypt.**

Effort 3 **Position Israel as a Partner in Shaping the Regional Architecture**

Key concrete steps:

- Convene the **"Riyadh Conference"**: in coordination with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and the European Union, the new government will work to convene an internationally sponsored regional peace conference. The conference will lay the diplomatic foundations for two integrated initiatives: a gradual framework toward a two-state solution and, in parallel, the construction of the new regional architecture. It will formulate a plan for integrating these efforts. The summit will deepen the constructive engagement of the principal partners in regional initiatives, create a framework for strategic partnership between the new government and the Trump administration, and demonstrate to the Israeli public and the world that Israel has changed course. The conference should conclude the government's first 100 days – a major diplomatic achievement that

brings the process full circle by completing the initial phase of Israel's global and regional repositioning.¹⁰

- **Convene a renewed meeting of the expanded Negev Forum at the foreign-minister level – Negev Forum 2.0** – and invite Jordan and the Palestinian Authority to participate. The meeting will address the practical development of regional relations by advancing projects for implementation in the short and medium term.
- Establish an **interministerial coordinating team** led by the Foreign Ministry to **integrate Israel into IMEC** and advance national and regional projects that will serve as the initiative's building blocks.¹¹
- Launch a **U.S.-sponsored strategic dialogue with Turkey**. The dialogue would be conducted on the level of national security advisers or senior foreign policy planners. Its main aims would be to prevent unintended escalation, exchange assessments of regional developments, raise points of friction – especially Hamas's presence in Turkey – and identify areas of shared interest. This dialogue will hopefully provide the basis for a new Israeli-Turkish Détente.
- Work to convene **multilateral regional frameworks of strategic value to Israel**, particularly the quadrilateral forum with the United States, the **I2U2 forum with India and the UAE**, the **East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF)**, and a **summit of the Hellenic alliance**.
- Convene meetings between Israel's ministers of energy, public security, and environmental protection and their counterparts in Greece, Cyprus, Jordan, and Egypt to initiate **regional forums** in two main areas: **assistance in coping with extreme climate events, and electricity connectivity and renewable energy**.
- As part of Israel's effort to move from being an “energy island” to a regional electricity hub, **convene a meeting with the heads of Jordan's and Egypt's national electricity grids to launch joint work**, followed by

10 Holding an International Peace Conference After the Israel-Hamas War / Prof. Arie Kacowicz (January 2024).

11 IMEC 2.0: A New Regional Vision for the Day After the War in Gaza / Dr. Gedaliah Afterman (February 2026).

meetings with grid operators from Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria. Establish expert engineering teams to assess feasibility and advance the technical work needed to connect the grids.

Effort

4

Build Partnerships to Address the Iranian Threat

Key concrete steps:

- Formulate understandings with the U.S. administration and **leading regional partners on red lines and courses of action in the event of an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons**. Such a breakout is an immediate threat whose likelihood has increased in the aftermath of the latest war in Iran. Addressing it is a strategic necessity amid declining U.S. willingness to take military action. This requires **joint operational planning with the United States and regional states** for such a scenario, and public exposure of these red-lines.
- Take a series of steps vis-à-vis Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Jordan to **strengthen cooperation with existing governments, prevent Iran from increasing its influence in the region, and weaken the influence of its proxies** – for details, see the preceding sections on the region.
- **Strengthening operational interfaces through CENTCOM and other regional cooperation frameworks** to deepen intelligence and technological cooperation against **security challenges, with an emphasis on UAVs and high-trajectory weapons**.
- Integrate Israel in practical terms into the **U.S.-led international task force working to secure maritime trade routes in the Red Sea and Gulf region**.
- Subject to U.S. agreement, explore launching a **strategic dialogue with China** at the national-security-adviser level to discuss the Iranian threat and China's critical positions on the issue.

3. Restoring the Strategic Alliance with the United States

Effort
1

Build a Trust-Based Relationship with the Trump Administration and the U.S. Political System in a manner that Advances Israel's Strategic Objectives

Key concrete steps:

- **A foundational visit to Washington: hold a meeting with President Trump at the White House**, alongside meetings with members of the House of Representatives. The visit will include an **address to a joint meeting of Congress**, in which the PM will present the new government's diplomatic doctrine. **A security agreement with Syria will be signed during this visit.**
- **Diplomatic arrangements with Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza will create an opportunity to renew the strategic partnership with the United States from a proactive position** that safeguards Israel's interests. Advancing the **"Riyadh Conference"** will also provide a practical arena for building the new strategic alliance between Israel and the Trump Administration.
- Cooperation with the Gaza Executive Board and NCAG – will be designed to turn them into **operational partners of Israel's security apparatus** and strengthen **Israel's influence over the emerging order.**
- Continue professional-level dialogue between the two governments on **the future of U.S. security assistance to Israel.**
- **Hold meetings** between Israeli government officials and diplomats with members of Congress, policymakers, and opinion leaders **from across American society who are critics of Israeli policy.**

Effort
2

Repair Relations with the American Jewish Community

Key concrete steps:

- Hold meetings between government ministers and leaders of **all streams of the Jewish community**.
- Adopt a government resolution **convening a dialogue** between the Government of Israel and representatives of Jewish communities in the Diaspora to discuss **disputed issues**, including prayer at the Western Wall and conversion.

4. Israel and Europe

The government will strive to repair relations with Europe and reshape a reciprocal strategic partnership, recognizing Europe's importance to Israel's economy, security, and science, and to Israel's belonging to the Western democratic world.

Effort 1 Put Relations with EU Institutions Back on a Track of Mutual Trust and Operational Coordination, while blocking Boycott Initiatives and Legal Action Against the State of Israel

Key concrete steps:

- Renew the working channel with High Representative for Foreign Affairs **Kaja Kallas** and invite her for an official visit to Israel.
- The foreign minister will address the **EU Foreign Affairs Council**.
- Formulate an initial **diplomatic action plan** at the political and professional levels to chart a strategic course for **the long-term upgrading of relations with Europe** and anchor it by signing new agreements. As part of this effort, relations with EU institutions and key member states should be comprehensively mapped, including an assessment of risks and the establishment of clear annual objectives and performance indicators.

Effort 2 Strengthen Direct Diplomatic and Security Ties with Key European Countries

Key concrete steps:

- The foreign minister will meet **counterparts in Berlin, Paris, and London** to signal a fresh start and create diplomatic momentum with the West.
- Establish a senior joint team of the Foreign Ministry and National Security Council to **map the defense-export restrictions and downgrading measures** adopted by individual European states and define a focused work plan to remove them and prevent their expansion.

- The Ministry of Defense will seek **memoranda of understanding with defense industries in Germany and the United Kingdom** in the fields of cyber, air defense, digitalization, and the integration of artificial intelligence into defense systems.
- Establish permanent working channels with European governments to advance **joint plans for combating antisemitism**, blocking anti-Israel initiatives in international organizations, and distinguishing criticism of government policy from attacks on the State of Israel's right to exist.

Effort 3 Mobilize the European Union and Key States to Support Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts in the Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese Arenas, and Help Integrate Europe into Regional Connectivity Initiatives

Key concrete steps:

- Establish a joint roundtable for Israel, France, and the donor-state forum, the AHLC, to **condition financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority on civilian structural reforms**, full budget transparency, and efforts to combat incitement.
- Initiate with the European Union a **financial oversight mechanism to support the rehabilitation of the Palestinian economy** and ensure that funding serves the effort to **weaken Hamas**.
- **Support European participation in efforts to stabilize the northern front.** This should include European participation in the monitoring mechanism and multinational force deployed in southern Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah, as well as inclusion in the international coalition that will support Syrian state-building efforts and monitor the conduct of the al-Sharaa government.
- **Invite EU representatives** to serve as **active observers** at the reconvened **Negev Forum** and submit to the European Union and key states a financial work plan for participation in projects **under IMEC**.

Standing with Ukraine is not only the right thing to do; it is also the **smart course diplomatically, politically, and even in security terms**. It will help restore the State of Israel's standing in Western eyes while enabling vital practical exchange of defense and security knowledge.

Key concrete steps:

- **Declare support for Ukraine's sovereignty, affirm the illegitimacy of the Russian invasion, and call for a just solution to end the war as soon as possible.**
- **The foreign minister will visit Kyiv and invite President Zelenskyy for an official visit to Israel**, preferably accompanied by a broad diplomatic, defense, economic, and civil-society delegation.
- **The government should align more closely with European and international sanctions regimes** on Russia and prevent sanctions evasion through Israel.
- **Launch a dialogue of civil servants between Israel and Ukraine** to map issues of mutual interest for reciprocal learning, cooperation, and joint development in national defense. Both countries have substantial experience in protracted warfare, home-front defense, defense systems, infrastructure protection, civil resilience, emergency medicine, rehabilitation of casualties and infrastructure, and countering technological and cyber threats.
- **Regularize the status of Ukrainian citizens** who receive temporary protection in Israel by creating a residence framework, including continued access to the labor market and humanitarian consideration of family-reunification in some cases.

5. Israel's Foreign-Policy Establishment

Israel's diplomatic community must become an **integral part of the planning and decision-making on strategic questions of war and peace**. The foreign minister and members of the foreign-policy establishment should sit at the government's decision-making table, participate in Cabinet meetings, and play a meaningful role in the National Security Council.

Key concrete steps:

- Begin advancing the **"Diplomatic Alternatives Law"** requiring planning bodies and decision-makers to consider diplomatic alternatives at critical decision-making junctures leading into military action.¹²
- Establish a **permanent forum of directors general of ministries**, chaired by the director general of the Foreign Ministry, to coordinate interministerial work and synchronize government activity on foreign affairs.
- Allocate positions, resources, and capacities to **enhance the Foreign Ministry's strategic planning units and increase resources and budgets** for the ministry's activities.
- **Improve the interface between the diplomatic and security communities:** appoint Foreign Ministry ambassadors and diplomatic advisers within the defense establishment and the National Security Council, including a senior diplomat as head or deputy head of the NSC; establish a permanent Foreign Ministry forum bringing together representatives of all intelligence bodies – the Mossad, Shabak, and Military Intelligence – to synchronize ongoing intelligence and diplomatic information; post professional diplomats as diplomatic advisers to the IDF chief of staff and the heads of relevant IDF directorates, including the Planning Directorate and Military Intelligence, assign a military secretary to the foreign minister's office to improve interorganizational coordination.

12 Bill to Require Consideration of Nonmilitary Policy Alternatives (Legislative Amendments), 5781–2021.

- Launch staff work to establish a **Climate Diplomacy Division in the Foreign Ministry**: consolidate dispersed centers of expertise into a dedicated division that includes a department for multilateral cooperation and whose head serves as environmental adviser to the foreign minister.


3. A Possible Choreography for the Next Government's First 100 Days


- **The “Mount Scopus Address”:** the prime minister presents a political-diplomatic vision including the principles and initiatives the government intends to advance. In the address, the prime minister will:
 - Emphasize that the new security doctrine rests not only on the military dimension but also on diplomatic agreements, and on translating military achievements into diplomatic gains in pursuit of long-term security.
 - Declare Israel's commitment to implementing Trump's 20-Point Plan, including its commitment to building a gradual framework for a two-state solution; express the desire to conclude a security agreement with Syria and advance the framework agreement with Lebanon; and stress the importance of relations with Israel's peace partners, Egypt and Jordan.
 - Emphasize strategic partnership with the region as a central goal of the new government.
- Following the address, the prime minister will embark on a **regional tour**: first meeting Egyptian President el-Sisi in Cairo, then King Abdullah in Jordan, and finally UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed. During the tour, the prime minister will announce **acceptance in principle** of the Hamas disarmament plan – **Mladenov's 15-Point Plan**. On the tour's conclusion, the partners will announce the reconvening of the **Negev Forum 2.0 summit in Amman**, with Jordanian and Palestinian participation.
- In parallel with the regional visits, the government will immediately implement **steps to stabilize the West Bank and advance the Trump Plan in Gaza**. In the West Bank, it will move to evacuate outposts, remove checkpoints, arrest violent settlers, and establish a mechanism for releasing clearance revenues to the Palestinian Authority. In Gaza, it

will support humanitarian reconstruction efforts and the work of aid institutions and organizations, authorize NCAG to enter Gaza, adopt a government resolution expressing commitment to the Trump Plan, and support the launch of a pilot in southern Gaza under an improved framework based on Mladenov's 15-Point Plan.

- Professional staff in government ministries **will resume work with their Palestinian counterparts**, with an emphasis on deepening security coordination with the Palestinian Authority's security apparatus and reconvening the joint committees.
- At the same time, **talks with representatives of the al-Sharaa government** will resume at the foreign-minister level, and another meeting will be held in Rome to finalize the security agreement in preparation for its signing in Washington. **Dialogue with Lebanon will be accelerated**, and the Government of Israel will make several **gestures to strengthen the legitimacy of the Lebanese government**.
- **An official visit to Washington:** the visit will include a meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office; **the signing of a security agreement with Syria** on the White House lawn; an announcement by President Trump convening a **regional-international peace conference**; and an **address by the prime minister to a joint meeting of Congress** presenting Israel's updated foreign policy. A professional delegation will remain in Washington to advance a strategic dialogue with U.S. officials on **red lines regarding Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons**.
- The foreign minister will continue from Washington to a **meeting of European foreign ministers in Brussels**. On the return journey from Washington, the prime minister will stop in Berlin to **meet the German Chancellor**.
- **The foreign minister will continue from Brussels to Kyiv**, express Israel's support for Ukraine and for a just resolution to end the war and invite Ukrainian President Zelenskyy for an official visit to Israel.
- The prime minister will host a **summit in Jerusalem** with the leaders of the **Hellenic alliance** – the president of Cyprus and the prime minister of Greece.

- Under U.S. auspices, the **national security advisers of Israel and Turkey will hold direct meetings.**
- Israel's energy minister will attend a **meeting of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum**, promote expanding its mandate to include **renewable energy**, and examine adding **Lebanon and Syria** as members.
- **The upgraded Negev Forum will convene in Amman**; the working groups will resume their activities; and a committee will be established to create a regional emergency mechanism for climate and environmental crises.
- At the conclusion of the first 100 days, **the U.S. administration will convene a regional-international conference in Riyadh** to develop a **five-year strategic vision for the region**. Leaders and representatives seated around the table will include those from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, India, China, the Palestinian Authority, European states, and the United States.





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