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“Security is not just the tank, the airplane, and the missile ship. Security is also, and perhaps above all, the person—the person, the Israeli citizen. Security is also the person’s education, their home, their street and neighborhood, the society in which they grew up. And security is also the person’s hope.”
(Yitzhak Rabin)
The Limitations of Military Solutions and the Necessity of Diplomatic Action
Dr. Gil Murciano, CEO of The Mitvim Institute – The military successes that Israel is achieving in its campaign against Iran highlight the gap between Israel’s capabilities in the military-kinetic sphere and its failure to act on the diplomatic level. The last-minute military campaign in Iran stems from a political failure—both Israeli and American—namely the withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement. Israel was forced into this situation because of the cumulative mistake of moving away from the diplomatic track. The focus on military achievements distracts from the critical question: What is Israel’s exit strategy from this dangerous war? Israel is currently focused on degrading Iranian capabilities in the nuclear and missile arenas, not on changing Iranian motivations.
This approach worked in Syria, but the Iranian nuclear project is a completely different story. Iran’s nuclear project is a national endeavor for which the country has sacrificed a great deal over three decades. It is a national interest of the regime to ensure its survival, to create deterrence against Israel, and to bolster Iran’s regional standing. The continuation of this project is a central narrative in Iran’s concept of national honor. Therefore, halting a project of this magnitude and significance requires a shift in Iran’s motivations.
How do you change Iranian motivations? Either through a face-saving agreement that guarantees Iran’s basic interests or through regime change. The likelihood of regime change in the foreseeable future is low. That leaves us with the option of an agreement. It seems that the Israeli attack has opened the door to a change in the Iranian leadership’s cost-benefit calculations—it sharpens the realization that the nuclear project has shifted from a tool to ensure regime survival to a threat to its stability. But the ability to change Iranian thinking—to persuade Iran to give up military nuclear development through a long-term agreement—depends on the diplomatic component. It requires a framework that offers Iran a way to step back from the nuclear project without losing face, allowing the Iranian regime to claim victory before agreeing to abandon its military nuclear program.
On the international level, the success of such an agreement would require a multilateral coalition similar to the one that convinced Iran to sign the 2015 nuclear agreement. A combination of international players would be needed—not just the U.S., but also China, with its significant influence on Iran’s economy, as well as Russia and Saudi Arabia. The good news is that international actors—especially the Gulf states—have an urgent interest in promoting such a solution. The bad news is that it’s unclear whether they have the tools to stop the escalation and put the genie back in the bottle.
Eitan Ishai, Head of Middle East and North Africa Division at Mitvim – A plausible possibility is that the Islamic regime in Iran will survive the current confrontation but emerge from it weakened, both internally and externally. In such a situation, the regime will need to reassess and reexamine fundamental assumptions that formed the basis of the strategy it cultivated and led for years. This could lead it to choose between two alternatives: adopting a more moderate approach toward nuclear and regional issues with the aim of “improving positions” and strengthening its status anew; or alternatively, adopting a rigid and aggressive approach aimed at rapid restoration of Iranian deterrence and regional status.
Either way, Israel bears the responsibility to ensure that Iran cannot benefit from a vacuum created following the tectonic changes the region has experienced. Preventing Iran’s renewed penetration into Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and other arenas will not be possible through continuous military activity alone. Instead, a political and diplomatic strategy is required. Israel must strengthen and restore its relations with its allies in the region and beyond, and develop partnerships with power brokers that serve its interests to ensure they do not lose their power and create a vacuum that will once again be filled by hostile forces.
Israel’s relations with the world depends on ending the war in Gaza, not on the outcomes of its fight with Iran
Dr. Nimrod Goren, President and Founder of Mitvim Institute; Executive Board Member at Diplomeds – The Council for Mediterranean Diplomacy – The initial days of fighting with Iran brought significant damage to Israeli citizens – loss of life, property damage and a blow to personal security. Alongside the essential public discourse surrounding this, the discussion in Israel about physical disconnect from the world stands out. The closure of the airport, prohibition on leaving the country, difficulties of Israelis returning from abroad and inequality that allows those with means or connections to circumvent prohibitions – all make headlines. This also happened during previous national crises, such as COVID-19, and once again emphasizes how much Israeli society — despite the common belief that “the whole world is against us” – yearns for connection and belonging to the international community. Such a connection is not just measured in the technical aspect of incoming and outgoing flights from Ben Gurion Airport, but in deeper layers related to policy, mindsets, perceptions, and even international law. In these regards, Israel is in constant estrangement from the international community.
This is not due to the war with Iran, but because of the never-ending war in Gaza, which until recently seemed to have exhausted the world, and which now – following Israel’s cancellation of the ceasefire and prevention of humanitarian aid – returned to top the agenda. Even as governments continue to promote relations with Israel – openly or secretly, based on shared interests, and sometimes alongside criticism of Israeli policies – the publics in many countries are distancing themselves. In culture, academia, sports, economy, and tourism, the decline in Israel’s standing is evident, and the difficulty of being part of the global family – is increasing. In Israel, there is concern even about traveling to Western capitals – from simple things like presenting an Israeli passport at the airport, taking a taxi with a potentially hostile driver, the reception one might receive at a hotel or restaurant, and the terrifying new moment in small talk when a foreign interlocutor asks the Israeli tourist, “Where are you from?”.
A good connection with the world is necessary for Israeli foreign policy, but is also an integral part of national security and a significant layer in the ability of Israeli citizens to thrive, enjoy, and fulfill their talents. The reopening of Ben Gurion Airport after a few more days of fighting in Iran will, of course, be positive, but it will not eradicate the deep-seated problems. These must be solved via leadership change in Israel. Improvement will only be felt once Israel has a prime minister that chooses to end the war in Gaza, strive for peace, and emphasize a commitment to liberal and democratic values.
Dr. Omer Zanany, Head of the Joint Unit for Peace and Security of Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katznelson foundation – For the first time since the beginning of the “Iron Swords”, the war against Iran has transformed the Gaza arena and the Palestinian arena as a whole to a “secondary arena.” As the war with Iran continues, the deepening of negative trends is expected: First, distancing the possibility of a political initiative.
The Israeli attack has already succeeded in leading to the postponement of the French-Arab declaration regarding the Palestinian state. The involved countries, led by France and Britain, are now forced to direct attention to dealing with Iran and stopping the war in the Middle East. Second, neglecting the hostages. The public debate regarding the necessity of a hostage deal and of ending the war in Gaza has been erased from public discourse, along with the attention and the political actions to advance this. Finally, the attention given to the war in Iran allows the Israeli government to continue advancing extreme measures in the Palestinian arena, including, among other things, Deepening the annexation, population expulsion from West Bank cities, reshaping the settled Palestinian space, and continuing moves for long-term Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip.
Against the backdrop of these dangers, the democratic camp must highlight, even more nowadays, the vitality of returning the hostages and ending the war in Gaza, and simultaneously, the need to learn lessons from managing the war in Gaza, emphasizing shortening the duration of wars and the necessity of advancing a political move for “the day after”. Looking ahead, the central challenge is to highlight the strong linkage between ending the war in Gaza and ending the war with Iran. This, as a platform for advancing a new regional architecture in the Middle East, in the spirit of “the Israeli Initiative” that promotes Israel’s national interests and lead to a stable regional settlement.
Israel-US Relations
Nadav Tamir, Board Member of Mitvim and Director of J-Street Israel – The attack on Iran could have been justified if it had been part of a broad strategy coordinated with the US to advance a US-Iran arrangement. There is no military way to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and there is a danger that the attack will actually push Iran, not to be satisfied with the nuclear threshold, and following the Libyan lesson and in contrast to the North Korean one, to break through to the bomb.
Netanyahu and Trump are both responsible for the strategic error of US withdrawal from the JCPOA, which caused Iran to reach the status of a threshold state in terms of uranium enrichment and a strategic alliance with Russia and China. The Israeli strategy should be to achieve an influential position on the agreement and not to prevent it. This should be done by increasing coordination with the US and achieving maximum intimacy and transparency.
Prof. Benny Miller, University of Haifa – Throughout the election campaign and even after entering the White House, President Trump declared numerous times that he aspires to be a president of peace, meaning he will prevent wars and end them. Therefore, a common assumption on the eve of the Israeli military action against Iran was that Israel would not attack Iran—an attack that could lead to a large-scale war.
This assumption was based on Israel’s very high military and political dependence on the US, which does not allow large-scale military action against Iran without US approval. Despite initial denials, it is now clear that there was American approval for the Israeli action. The US also participates in defending Israel—similar to its activity in previous Iranian attacks in April and October 2024. However, according to the logic of the President’s statements, the following developments can be expected:
(1) The US was widely expected not to participate in Israeli offensive activity—despite it being very necessary for the complete destruction of the Iranian nuclear program, although this might be changing very recently as we discuss below;
(2) The US sees Israeli military successes as leverage to return Iran to the diplomatic negotiating table regarding its nuclear program—but now under much more favorable conditions for achieving a nuclear agreement that meets American demands to prevent uranium enrichment by Iran. The question in this context is whether the Israeli government will view positively a return to diplomatic negotiations in light of the government’s concerns that any agreement contains a possible danger of preserving some aspect of the Iranian nuclear program;
(3) As someone with non-liberal views, from President Trump’s perspective, there is no importance to the internal character of the actors, meaning the character of the regime. In some respects, there may even be advantages to achieving agreements with “strong” leaders who enjoy great freedom of action and without significant opposition. Therefore, it does not appear that the President will be a partner—at least not at this stage—in the hopes of many in Israel for regime change in Iran and the overthrow of the Ayatollah regime; However, if the supposedly “strong” Supreme Leader of Iran and his regime are viewed as weak, as might be the situation as the war develops, the willingness of Trump to join the fight might potentially grow considerably.
(4) Israel must not be caught pushing the US into war—if this is contrary to Washington’s policy. There is already a significant isolationist element among Trump supporters (the MAGA movement) that strongly opposes US involvement in wars in general and in the Middle East in particular—in light of the failures and high costs of previous American interventions in the region: Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001) as well as the very destabilizing intervention in Libya (2011). Of course, the Democratic Party also has very broad opposition to US involvement in Middle East wars beyond defensive actions for Israel;
(5) All these calculations could change if Iran makes the mistake of attacking American forces stationed in the Middle East and then the American willingness to join the fight might increase considerably;
(6) While it is true that Trump has been a strong opponent of resorting to force overseas, this might be changing in the last day or so. One source of this change might be Trump’s highly favorable approach toward the “winners.” At least at this stage, (Wed. morning Israel time), Israel appears to be the clear-cut “winner” with many highly effective military strikes on the Iranian nuclear program. Another potential source for Trump’s changing position toward joining the war might be the Evangelist base of his supporters—a key element in Trump’s camp—which is not only extremely pro-Israel but perceives the Middle East conflict in biblical terms, namely as a conflict between “good” (Israel) and “evil”—radical Islam.
The Middle East Conflicts, in which Israel is engaged, are viewed by the Evangelists as a key part of a Clash of Civilizations between the Judeo-Christian civilization and radical Islam while Israel is standing in the frontiers of this fight against the evil Islamists (whether Shiites or Sunnis). However, we shouldn’t forget, as was said above, that powerful elements in both parties—whether MAGA among the Republican party or liberal Democrats— are vehemently opposed to American military interventions in the Middle East and might potentially blame Israel – and its American supporters – for any potential failure or high costs. This could be very dangerous for the future of the crucial US-Israel relations.
On the other hand, successful American air strikes on the Iranian nuclear program—with no American casualties– might be very beneficial for Israel’s security, although it would demonstrate in a very dramatic way the extremely high Israeli dependence on the US for its national security.
The War and the Home Front
Dr. Orni Livny, Deputy CEO of The Mitvim Institute – There is a direct connection between the failure of home front preparedness and the gendered worldview. The gap between Israel’s intelligence and operational capabilities and the failure to prepare for the operation’s implications on the home front is incomprehensible. In the military and tactical sphere, Israel receives an excellent grade, but in the civilian sphere, the grade is very low.
The same country that knows where every nuclear scientist’s bedroom is in Tehran, doesn’t know that there are no shelters in Tamra and that more than half of the apartments in the country lack protected rooms. This reality stems from a point that has been repeatedly raised over the past two and a half years: the exclusion of women from key decision-making roles, and the consistent neglect of issues that fall outside the narrow focus of war management. This is not just a a question of how many women have a seat at the table, but a more substantial question: what topics are discussed around that table, and what values guide decision-making? Incorporating gender perspectives into all strategic and policy decisions broadens the perspective of decision-makers, shifting their focus from military force and combat tactics to civilian issues related to personal security, national resilience, and equality.
This is true for formulating Israel’s foreign policy and also for the decision to start a war. The civilian aspect is an integral part of the military aspect, and one doesn’t need to be a woman to adopt this conception. For so many years, intelligence personnel and air force teams prepared for the “D-Day” of attacking Iran nuclear facilities and presumably prepared for various scenarios and conducted simulations on how to deal with them. But in the civilian sphere—only after the Iranian response, did government ministries suddenly discover that protected spaces were lacking, that there weren’t enough solutions for vulnerable populations, and that thousands of Israelis stranded abroad somehow needed to be brought home.
The impression is that in all the discussions and assessments, there was no one to stand up and ask how eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities would affect Israelis in the immediate and long term and what needs to be done so that not only the air force would be ready for the mission, but also the home front. Unfortunately, it’s clear that even if one of the female ministers had joined the restricted cabinet discussion that approved the attack, the civilian aspect would still have been considered “collateral damage” (see: Miri Regev, Minister of Transportation, who only, at the end of Shabbat, began thinking about what to do with closed skies).
We need more women around decision-making tables, not because of gender, but because of their professional skills. However, to adopt a gender perspective that integrates military tactics with civilian implications, we first need a leadership that prioritizes the well-being of citizens over its own political survival.
The European Perspective
Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Director of the Israel-Europe Relations Program – Since Iran supplied Russia with UAVs and ballistic missiles used in its war in Ukraine and potentially threatening other European countries, it became a “friend of the enemy,” meaning an indirect enemy of most of Europe. Ostensibly, Europe’s natural choice is to be on Israel’s side, and this is indeed the case, but things are somewhat more complex. The statement by the 27 EU member states expressed deep concern about the escalation between Israel and Iran, called for restraint from both sides, and emphasized the EU’s commitment to Israel’s and the region’s security and preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
However, the EU statement refrained from recognizing Israel’s right to self-defense – a notable change compared to previous confrontations with Iran or elsewhere. High Representative Kaja Kallas emphasized the need for diplomacy. The EU position may have several explanations: First, Israel was the one that attacked, and there is no consensus that this was a last-resort attack. Second, harsh feelings that have accumulated against the Israeli government regarding its handling of the war in Gaza. Third, as always, the EU statement is a balancing act among the 27 members, and there is no unanimity on the issue.
Germany and France expressed clearer positions. Germany, led by Chancellor Merz, condemned the Iranian nuclear program, strengthened Israel’s right to defend itself, and even elevated this to the defence of Israel’s existence. Merz said that “the goal must remain that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.” France expressed support for Israel’s security and its readiness to participate in defending Israel, but not in attacking Iran. Israel did not make use of France’s readiness to help, perhaps due to its role in the summit advancing Palestinian statehood which was supposed to take place in NY on 17-20 June. Britain stood out with its coolish statements.
The government emphasized the need for de-escalation, refrained from explicit support for Israel, and clarified that it did not assist in the operation. Israel did not inform Britain about the attack, apparently in response to Britain’s suspension of trade talks with Israel on May 20, indicating significant cooling in relations. It’s possible that the British want to see how the US President will conduct himself and then determine a clearer position, as there are pressures within the Labour Party in Britain that don’t necessarily work in Israel’s favor. After Israel significantly weakened Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Gaza and indirectly brought about the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria – a development the EU is very happy about. Weakening Iran can also help in the fight against the Houthis who disrupt maritime trade through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Europeans also know that Iranian ballistic missiles’ range reaches them too. In the long run, weakening the threat from the “head of the snake,” Iran, should allegedly lead to increased stability in the Middle East. This too is a result Europe is interested in. Against the oppressive Ayatollah regime domestically and nurturing aggressive proxies externally, Israel is the right side to choose. It is performing the work that Sunni states want it to complete. The possibility of the Tehran regime’s fall is a possibility that governments and a significant part of the European public support.
In European public opinion polls, Israel has reached a significant low, but there is one country whose situation is worse, and that is Iran. It should be remembered that in Iran’s hijab protest, which the Ayatollah regime brutally suppressed, Europe supported the protest and women’s and human rights, and European public opinion was against the Iranian regime, so many in Europe understand the service Israel is doing for the West in the current war. Still, due to European division, it appears that Israel stands in the European arena with only partial support, also afraid of being seen as supporting the Israeli attack, and also because of the context of the war in Gaza that limits the extent of support.
The Hellenic Alliance Provides Strategic Depth for Israel
Former Ambassador Michael Harari, Research and Policy Fellow – The Israeli attack succeeded in surprising Iran while maintaining close and impressive coordination with Washington. A kind of division of labor is being implemented whereby Israel does the “dirty work,” which aims, it seems, to return the Iranians to the negotiating table from a position of weakness. Apparently, after just a few days of attacks, it appears that the Iranians are interested in ceasefire and returning to negotiations. Israel is not satisfied with this and seeks to continue military pressure on Iran despite the damage to the Israeli home front.
Israel enjoys regional support in silence, of course alongside lip service condemnations, and significant support in the international arena. For now, it appears that Washington is backing Israel, but this raises the question of how long the rope is. Iran’s willingness to ceasefire, backed by threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, indicates an Iranian assessment that it’s better at this stage to stop the Israeli military move, even at the price of some humiliation, and return to negotiations with the US. It’s unclear whether Israel has marked regime change as the current goal, and if so, this is a dangerous pretentious move, and there is serious doubt whether it enjoys American support.
The attack on Iran also returned and highlighted the close and strategic relationship between Israel and Greece and Cyprus. Both countries, and Cyprus especially, impressively demonstrate their role as strategic depth for Israel, from security and civilian perspectives. It’s important to note, however, that in recent months there has been growing criticism in Greek and Cypriot public opinion about the continuation of the war in Gaza, particularly around the humanitarian crisis and the large number of civilian casualties in the Gaza Strip.
These feelings are not reflected in the policies of both governments, which was particularly emphasized during the visits of the Greek Prime Minister and Cypriot President to Israel. At the same time, the growing public criticism joined by leading opposition parties in both countries should not be taken lightly.
