/ All Events
At Mitvim’s 8th Annual Regional Foreign Policy Conference at the Yitzhak Rabin Center in Tel Aviv, Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu sat down with Ambassador Michael Mann for a candid conversation on the future of EU–Israel relations and Europe’s role in the “day after” in Gaza. The discussion took place at a particularly sensitive moment: after the ceasefire and hostage deal, with a stabilization force in the making, while the list of steps the EU prepared to inflict on Israel still on the table, and mutual distrust and criticism are still high.
“Strained Friendship: Israel – EU Relations Still Under High Political Tensions”
Sion-Tzidkiyahu opened by noting the depth of the current crisis. After October 7, Europe stood strongly by Israel in solidarity, she recalled, but “what Israel did in Gaza in the past year, especially withholding humanitarian assistance for months,” has strained the relationship to an unprecedented degree.
She cited Mitvim’s Foreign Policy Index from August, showing that 67% of Israelis now view the EU as an adversary and only 14% as a friend – the worst results since 2018 – and asked whether EU policy is understood in Israel, and whether the current moment is a “reset” or a new era of mistrust.
Mann acknowledged the complexity – but insisted on one core point:
“We must never forget that the European Union is historically, and still, a great friend of Israel.”
He stressed that trade, research, culture and people-to-people ties remain strong, while the Israeli–Palestinian issue has “always made things a bit challenging.” What is new, he noted, is that for the first time the EU has formally put possible restrictive measures against Israel on the table.
Those proposed steps – not yet adopted by the member states – include suspending certain trade preferences, freezing a small part of Israel’s participation in the Horizon research program, additional sanctions on extremist settlers (alongside measures against Hamas), and pausing some bilateral cooperation.
According to Mann, the rationale was clear:
“We felt the political need to put some pressure on Israel to try and get it to change direction.”
Israel’s blocking of humanitarian aid to Gaza for around two months, he said, made it “inevitable” for the EU to examine whether Israel was in line with its obligations under the Association Agreement. At the same time, he emphasized that the EU’s leverage is limited, and that the aim is not punishment but signaling: “We are doing this from a position of friendship… we have political pressure in our member countries. We need to be able to put some pressure on Israel to move in the direction that we think is the right direction.” He added: “We’ve decided to leave the measures on the table because there are still things that we want Israel to do.”
These are bad times in the relationship, but the ceasefire and the Trump 20-point plan, he added, also create “a good time” to be EU ambassador in Israel: all the living hostages have been released and most of the dead ones have been returned, a moment where humanitarian access has improved, and a diplomatic framework exists that “ticks most of the boxes the European Union wants to see in Gaza” – even if disagreements remain. It “gives me hope that the relationship can start moving in the right direction,” said Mann.
From Payer to Player? Europe and the “Day After” in Gaza
Turning to Gaza, Sion-Tzidkiyahu highlighted a long-standing paradox: the EU is the largest humanitarian donor in Gaza and a principal donor to the Palestinian Authority, yet has been largely absent from the inner circle shaping the Trump 20-point plan.
“Europe is paying a lot,” she said, “but is not really at the decision-making table.” Why is the EU not more central to the design of the “day after” – and what role can it now claim?
Mann accepted the “payer not player” criticism to a degree, but argued that the content of the Trump plan in fact mirrors many EU priorities: PA governance reform, a role for the PA, civil society support, policing, borders, reconstruction and de-mining.
“We weren’t part of the plan, perhaps,” he said, “but whoever wrote it clearly had in mind things we are interested in.”
He emphasized the civilian side and EU expertise in fields the CMCC is new to, and laid out several concrete areas where the EU intends to act:
A key tool, Mann stressed, will be conditional support to the PA. For the first time, EU funding – €1.6 billion for 2025–2027 – is “strictly conditioned” on reforms. If the EU can leverage its assistance to the PA to persuade them to reform in a meaningful way, this would be highly significant.
Humanitarian aid & access: The EU alone has allocated €550 million for Gaza from its budget, in addition to member-state contributions. Brussels is still pushing for better access for international NGOs, EU humanitarian staff and journalists. “We have, I think, won the argument that that has to be part of the equation,” he said.
Reconstruction & infrastructure: Even before October 7, the EU funded desalination and energy projects (“Gas for Gaza”). Mann said the Union plans to be a “major part” of reconstruction efforts and has already created a Palestine donor group that will meet in Brussels. He clarified: “we can’t pick up the bill ourselves, but we can contribute.”
Governance & security sector: the scope of EUPOL COPPS, the EU’s mission that trains Palestinian police, could be extended to train a future police force in Gaza. The border assistance mission at Rafah, EUBAM Rafah, proved its usefulness during the previous ceasefire and is ready to resume and expand.
Civil society & interfaith dialogue: These appear explicitly in the Trump plan, and are traditional EU strengths. “We have expertise,” he said, pointing also to areas like de-mining.
To conclude, Mann said “we weren’t part of the plan, but whoever wrote the plan clearly had in the back of their mind things that we are interested in. There is a political horizon for Palestinian governance, a future role for the Palestinian Authority, and these are all things that we can help with. And we’re optimistic that we can get in there quickly and we can put our imprint on the implementation of the Trump Plan”.
“Unless we can persuade the Palestinians to make these reforms meaningful, they’re unlikely to be at the table.”
Linking assistance to PA reform, and tying that to discussions at the Civil–Military Coordination Center in Kiryat Gat, is in his view one way for Europe to move from the margins closer to the core of “day after” decision-making.
Two States, De-Facto Annexation and the West Bank Reality
In the final part of the conversation, Sion-Tzidkiyahu turned to the West Bank. While the EU remains the most consistent supporter of a two-state solution, she said, de-facto annexation is advancing on the ground through settlement expansion, settler violence and the displacement of Palestinians from Area C.
What more can the EU do – both to confront these trends and to convince Israelis that a viable two-state framework serves their long-term interests?
Mann responded that Europe is acting on several tracks:
Conditioning aid to the PA on reforms — including “de-radicalization” in education and moving away from prisoner stipends toward a general social security system. Progress here has been slow, he admitted, but he insisted that “there is no doubt the Palestinian Authority is serious about doing this,” knowing that its international legitimacy depends on it.
Pushing Israel to transfer the clearance revenues it withholds from the PA: “We can’t finance the PA single-handedly,” he said, pointing also to the need to maintain the correspondent banking system that allows transfers via Israeli banks.
Sanctions on extremist settlers: The EU has already sanctioned several individuals and organizations and is considering more, though internal consensus is not yet reached.
Working with partners: Mann underlined the importance of coordination with the US and with key Arab states such as the UAE, which have already weighed in against annexation moves and see a stable, reformed PA as crucial, among other things to strengthen its legitimacy.
On a specific question about construction plans in the E1 area, Mann was cautious about setting “red lines”:
“Talk of red lines is always a bit dangerous. We have a certain amount of leverage over Israel, but not the sort of leverage the Americans have.”
Instead, he argued, the EU should focus where its influence is strongest: bolstering credible Palestinian governance, applying legal and diplomatic pressure on illegal acts on the ground, and working in tandem with Washington and Arab partners to keep annexation off the table.
Despite the “grim” realities in the West Bank, Mann ended on a cautiously optimistic note:
“We’re in a positive place at the moment, and we should build on that positivity.”
Sion-Tzidkiyahu closed the session by returning to the conference’s central theme – choosing diplomacy: “I hope that together, Israelis and Europeans, we can build hope by choosing the diplomatic path.”
Photo & video: Constantin Grossman
