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The collapse of the Assad regime confronts Israel with a familiar dilemma, one with which decision-makers grappled a decade ago in the early stages of the Syrian civil war. The question is whether to intervene and contribute to the shaping of the emerging order in Syria or to opt for “splendid isolation” – observing the unfolding events from the sidelines and taking action only to protect Israel’s immediate security interests.
Israel has so far acted true to form, limiting its actions to the military sphere by creating a new buffer zone in Syria and destroying the offensive capabilities of Bashar al-Assad’s army, especially its missile and chemical weapons systems.
But if Israel is to have an impact on shaping this strategically positioned space, it must adopt a broad diplomatic initiative.
How can Israel reshape Syria?
At the current decision-making juncture, we must realize that the process of reshaping Syria is already underway. We must also recognize that in the emerging Syrian narrative, Israel is deemed to have played an integral part in liberating the country from the atrocities of the Assad regime and its Iranian patrons.
My conversations with Syrian colleagues clearly point to the perception that Israel’s victory over Hezbollah had a major impact on the Syrian army’s collapse and provides it with unique influence on future events.
However, resting on our laurels and reveling in the scenes of looting at the Iranian embassy in Damascus is a path fraught with risks. Anyone who thinks the Iranians have washed their hands of Syria probably does not understand the economic situation in Syria or does not know the Iranian regime.
As it has done in Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria itself at the end of the previous decade, Iran excels at exploiting political transitions. While currently perceived as a central pillar of Assad’s oppressive regime – having gambled on his survival and faced setbacks – Iran has shown a remarkable ability to adapt to shifting circumstances.
It has consistently demonstrated a talent for forging alliances, particularly in the face of domestic political vacuums and economic needs. The rebel takeover of Syria only deepens these needs. The Iranians have demonstrated impressive skills in building strategic ties with Syria’s non-Shi’ite population groups, such as the Sunnis and Druze in the south of Syria, and large Sunni tribes in the border area with Iraq.
Let us not forget, either, that the Iranians play a significant role in keeping Syria’s energy and electricity sector running. Iran therefore has significant cards to play against the forces trying to shape a new order in a devastated country despite the innate hostility between them and the rebels in Damascus. Iran’s leaders have, in fact, already expressed a desire to develop ties with the new Syrian regime.
ISRAEL MUST recognize that the current vacuum is temporary and therefore requires it to adopt a far more proactive approach than it did during the Syrian civil war. That includes two policy measures that point in opposite directions but seek to deal with the current uncertainty.
First, Israel must strengthen its relations with major political actors in Syria – the emphasis is, of course, on the Druze in the south, and on Rojava, the autonomous Kurdish state that has emerged over the past decade in the strategic space of northeastern Syria.
The ties should be enhanced through a quiet and cautious dialogue given both the sensitivity of building such ties while the issue of political unity is paramount in Syria, and Israel’s standing in the region is at an all-time low.
In the words of a Syrian-Kurdish friend: This is the worst time to have a public relationship with Israel, and the most important time to have a quiet dialogue with it. Tweets on this matter by reckless Israeli ministers are not helpful to this sensitive effort.
Israel has maintained an informal relationship with the Druze for years, based on a series of unwritten agreements. This was most recently demonstrated last week when the IDF defended the Syrian Druze village of Khader against attacks by local rebels.
The relationship with the Kurds is more complex, in part because of its implications for Israeli-Turkish relations. However, a model for an unofficial strategic relationship already exists in Israel’s long-standing relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan. It is rooted, among other factors, in the Kurds’ perception of Israel as a role model for nation-building, survival, and prosperity in a hostile environment.
At the same time, Israel should actively encourage and support the international and regional economic rehabilitation of Syria. This reliance on foreign aid could serve as leverage to shape the future regime, conditioning assistance on the new government’s adoption of moderate policies both domestically and internationally.
Europe and the GCC countries previously refrained from engaging in Syria’s reconstruction because they did not want to strengthen the Assad regime, but that argument is now void.
A large-scale reconstruction process could encourage a return of refugees from Europe and the countries of the region to their homes, easing the burden on their host countries. Western nations and moderate Arab states also share a common interest in removing Russian and Iranian influence from Syria.
ISRAEL’S ROLE in Syria’s reconstruction would be modest but meaningful. Initially, it would focus on guaranteeing respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, with a commitment to cease attacks as long as the new regime ensures Iran’s exclusion. In the second phase, Israel could help facilitate reconstruction by allowing the use of its air and land routes for logistical support.
The past two years have highlighted the symbiotic relationship between developments in Gaza or the West Bank and events in Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran.
Israel’s continued military presence in Gaza complicates its coordination with the Arab world on rebuilding Syria and undermines the legitimacy of local actors to collaborate with it, either publicly or covertly. Ending the destructive war in Gaza is therefore crucial for Israel’s ability to engage with regional partners in reshaping the future order in Syria.
The past two years have also taught us an important lesson about the failure of Israel’s “villa in the jungle” approach – the danger of burying one’s head in the sand and ignoring regional developments, leaving the initiative in the hands of meaningful and hostile others. This misguided approach resulted in Iranian entrenchment in Syria and the upgrading of Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities.
Israel must seize the current opportunity to foster a stable and non-hostile relationship with its strategic neighbor to the north.
The article was published on December 18th in The Jerusalem Post.
