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The new government taking office after the upcoming elections will need to enact bold, far-reaching security and foreign policy shifts from its very first day. From the outset, it will face urgent decision-making junctures. The future of the Gaza Strip and implementation of Trump’s 15 points Plan, the active fronts in Lebanon and Syria, the international diplomatic and security campaign vis-à-vis Iran, and the U.S. midterm elections – are just some of the major developments on which policy must be formulated early in the term. These challenges will be compounded by significant domestic political constraints, including a strong and highly-committed pack of political spoilers. To shape a new reality of deep security for Israel’s citizens and begin the work of diplomatic rehabilitation, any new government will have no choice but to confront these challenges.
The government is set to begin from a difficult position. Israel’s response to the October 7 massacre, and the military campaigns that followed in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, have brought its relations with the region and the world to an unprecedented low, severely damaging both its security and its international legitimacy. The doctrine of “peace through strength” – the illusion that the Middle East can be reshaped through military force alone – has culminated in a situation of dangerous strategic inferiority. Israel has demonstrated impressive military capabilities, but it has failed to convert temporary operational gains into lasting diplomatic achievements. Moreover, its strategic failure has deepened as its ability to influence the regional decisions and processes that shape the fate and security of its citizens has steadily diminished. Partners and adversaries alike view Israel as a dangerous and irresponsible actor – a “natural spoiler” – and it is therefore excluded from the critical processes now rebuilding the regional order.
The government’s refusal to discuss proposed diplomatic plans – let alone propose any initiatives for resolving the various conflicts – has enabled the organizations and actors that threaten Israel in Gaza, Lebanon, and, to some extent, Syria to recuperate, regroup and regain strength. Hezbollah is working to rebuild its power in Lebanon, while Hamas controls Gaza and, thanks to the humanitarian crisis and the absence of a governing alternative, is replenishing its ranks among hungry young Gazans.
Over all looms the collapse of the peace-through-strength doctrine in the latest campaign in Iran. The illusion that military force could bring Iran’s citizens into the streets and produce dramatic regime change overnight led Israel to initiate a campaign that has damaged its strategic relationship with the United States, its international standing, and, above all, autonomy over its own decision making in matters of national security.
In the international arena, Israel is sliding toward pariah-state status. Public support for Israel in U.S. and European opinion polls has fallen to unprecedented lows; boycotts and sanctions by governments and private bodies are growing; senior Israeli officials are barred from entering key countries because of international arrest warrants or sanctions; Israeli academia is suffering an ongoing decline in external research grants; political elites across the Western world are increasingly challenging the State of Israel’s right to exist; and Israel’s place among Western democracies is in doubt.
A diplomatic and security change of course begins first and foremost with a conceptual shift in Israel’s security doctrine – it requires nothing less than reframing the meaning of security. This requires developing a new diplomatic-based security doctrine that rebalances military operations and diplomatic initiatives. Statecraft and diplomacy must be institutionalized as the “fifth pillar” of Israel’s national security doctrine.
Israel’s government will need to demonstrate a clear change of course that restores both domestic and international confidence. Unlike previous governments, the burden of proof will rest this time on the new government. Without real change – including concrete steps in the West Bank and in Gaza – it will be very difficult to halt Israel’s slide toward pariah-state status, rebuild its special relationship with the United States and the Western world, restore Israeli diplomatic initiative, and reposition Israel as a leading partner in shaping the Middle East’s new regional architecture. The next government will have to find a way to “close” the active war fronts and, where possible, transition to diplomatic arrangements that provide its citizens with long-term security.
If it advances these objectives, Israel’s next government will be able to seize historic opportunities arising out of recent developments. These include opportunities to significantly weaken Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank and Hezbollah in Lebanon by supporting political alternatives to their rule; the opportunity to forge new relationships with former enemies in the north; and economic and diplomatic opportunities arising from the disruption of maritime trade routes in the wake of the Iran campaign, which could enable Israel to join new regional connectivity initiatives.
Progress in the Palestinian arena is essential to achieving a diplomatic change of course in every arena discussed above. Israel’s next government will stand at a critical crossroads. The right decisions can transform the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a strategic liability pulling Israel toward a one-state reality and weakening its global standing into a key component in securing its citizens’ long-term security and strengthening the State of Israel’s national resilience.
This paper outlines the policy directions and steps that the new government should adopt in the diplomatic and national security arenas during its first 100 days. Some of these steps can be taken immediately, others require prior constructive processes to lay the ground.
The intention of the paper is to bring about a change in policy, not advocate for a political change. The concern is the policy of the State of Israel, not which politicians of what party advance it. Accordingly, nothing should be construed as a recommendation to vote for any particular party or political actor. The paper is relevant to any future government, regardless of partisan political identity, willing to take the necessary steps to reverse the present slide into a diplomatic and security abyss.
The paper seeks not only to list the issues on which the government must act but also to connect the dots – to trace the synergistic, intertwined, and carefully sequenced series of moves in the various arenas generated by a diplomatic change of course for Israel. The final section proposes a diplomatic choreography: a coordinated sequence of steps whose implementation would improve Israel’s diplomatic standing and strengthen its security resilience within 100 days of the government’s inauguration. Adopting these recommendations would yield significant achievements from the outset of the new government’s term and provide important momentum for the rest of its tenure.
