Op-eds
/ Israel and the Middle East
For decades, the Israeli peace camp has hoisted the two-state formula to the top of the flagpole as the solution to the conflict with the Palestinians. We believed that resolution of the “core of the Israeli-Arab conflict” would open the gate for Israel’s integration into the entire Arab region.
In retrospect, we should have realized that we had ignored the fact that the Palestinians could alone not provide answers to significant parts of the core issues of the conflict—the refugee issue, the Jerusalem issue, and, of course, the security envelope—because each one of them requires a regional approach.
In Oslo, Camp David, and even in the very advanced talks of then-Prime Minister Olmert with Abu Mazen, there was a lack of understanding of the necessity for a broad regional framework, which would provide the Palestinians with the backing to make the necessary compromises—and provide the Israelis with the incentive of the fruits of regional peace.
The Israeli right tried to exploit the failure to achieve an agreement in order to promote opposing approaches—Sharon attempted unilateralism following Barak’s assertion that there was no partner for an agreement, and Netanyahu marketed the illusion that regional peace could be achieved without a Palestinian component. Both of these approaches tragically exploded in our faces on October 7.
The events of October 7 and the ongoing war since then have ended the fantasies of most Palestinians to become a majority in a single democratic state between the river and the sea. Long beforehand, they had given up their hope that negotiations would lead to the establishment of their own state.
The terrible massacre that Hamas committed hardened the hearts of many Israelis, who had previously believed in the moral imperative to end control over a foreign people. The walls of fear and hostility have risen among both Israelis and Palestinians, two peoples who have paid an unbearable price over the past fifteen months.
We must internalize that for the Israeli public, the most important issue is security. After October 7, the Israeli public is more frightened, more suspicious, and less willing to consider moral arguments. Therefore, even those of us who believe that the occupation must end to avoid moral and strategic harm to Israeli democracy must offer the citizens of Israel an arrangement that allows them to achieve what they desire most of all: security.
Security is brought by diplomatic arrangements, such as those we have with Jordan and Egypt. Security that is derived from a united regional front against the axis of Shiite jihadism led by Iran and the Sunni jihadism that may emerge with Turkey’s backing after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.
Surveys by the Accord Center for Social Psychology at the Hebrew University, conducted even during the most difficult periods of the fighting, reveal that the Israeli public is willing to accept a Palestinian state if it comes in the form of a comprehensive normalization agreement between Israel and Arab countries. The majority of the Israeli public (about 61%) prefers separation from the Palestinians over annexation. The data indicates that ultimately, even when the winds of war are blowing, the Israeli public is much more realistic than its current leadership. Israelis understand that the path to security passes through normalization, which will include the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Arab normalization of relations with the State of Israel.
The current reality necessitates the promotion of a regional solution—a 23-state plan—which includes all Arab states, a demilitarized Palestinian state, and Israel as an integral part of the region. Unfortunately, a large proportion of Israeli citizens are not interested enough in ending the occupation. However, agreements that will bring about security and prosperity for Israelis and that will end the occupation will receive public support.
The challenge for the Peace Camp is to implement the “Arab initiative,” which was first presented in 2002 as a Saudi initiative but has effectively become an initiative of the Arab League. The “Arab Initiative” offers full normalization between Arab countries and Israel in exchange for a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian conflict based on the 1967 borders. During Obama’s presidency, Arab countries added the principle of land swaps at the request of US Secretary of State John Kerry.
The Abraham Accords did open the door to regional normalization and economic cooperation, but their disregard for the Palestinian issue limited them to a small number of countries and did not resolve the fundamental issues at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, after October 7, no Arab country can afford to ignore the Palestinian issue, and it is very clear from Saudi Arabian declarations that normalization must include a Palestinian state.
The important lesson from the Abraham Accords is that the Israeli public preferred normalization over annexation, which was avoided thanks to the UAE, which made clear to Trump that this was a red line that could not be crossed. Moreover, since the accords, many Israelis now recognize the advantages of normalization. Many of those who saw Arabs only as enemies have found the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco to be their preferred tourist destinations and enjoy the ability to fly cheaply and in less time to the Far East.
Together with Arab countries, the Biden Administration prepared a regional framework—that includes a Palestinian state—as a way to end the war in Gaza and achieve a governance alternative to Hamas. This framework is also in the interest of the Trump Administration and the entire Sunni world led by Saudi Arabia, and they have a better chance of addressing the objections of the Israeli right than the outgoing Biden Administration.
The Israeli peace camp should adopt a discourse that emphasizes strengthening Israel’s security, economy, and international legitimacy, all of which resonate with the Israeli people.
This will not convince the current government, which has been taken over by the most extreme elements of the Israeli right, but if it is the public’s will, in the end, a sane government will be established here that will work to implement it.
We need to create responses that are suitable for Israel in 2025—practical solutions to everyday problems. To turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a minefield for Israel’s integration into the region into the key to its advancement.
The article was published on January 8th in The Times of Israel.
